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This thesis perpetuates research aimed at deploying a diagnostic expert system for 
the MK 92 Mod 2 Fire Control System to 28 Oliver Hazard Perry class fast frigates. 
Referred to as the Maintenance Advisor Expert System (MAES), this expert system is 
being jointly developed by the Naval Postgraduate School and Port Hueneme Division, 
Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC PHD). 
This thesis focuses on the long-term implementation issues related to deploying 
MAES to the fleet, integrating MAES into the formal training pipeline, and transitioning 
life cycle support for MAES to NSWC PHD. MAES long-term implementation issues, 
which include hardware, software, documentation, and training requirements, are 
examined within the context of implementation factors and risks historically associated 
with deploying expert systems. 
Plans for deploying MAES to the fleet and integrating MAES into the formal 
training pipeline are provided. As part of the documentation necessary to transition life 
cycle support of MAES to NSWC, a System Level Description document is also provided. 
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A.       BACKGROUND 
In early 1992, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division (NSWC 
PHD) began development of a diagnostic expert system that would assist shipboard fire 
control technicians in troubleshooting the MK 92 Mod 2 Fire Control System (FCS). 
Found aboard the U.S. Navy's Oliver Hazard Perry class of guided missile fast frigates, 
the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS is based on 1970's technology and has evolved into a costly and 
difficult system to maintain. Outside technical assistance is often required by the ships to 
troubleshoot problems with the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS. 
At the request of NSWC PHD engineers in late 1992, Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) faculty and graduate students joined NSWC PHD in their efforts to develop this 
expert system which is called the Maintenance Advisor Expert System (MAES). This 
thesis continues the research, development, and implementation efforts involved in fielding 
MAES to the fleet. 
The development and fielding of MAES, though protracted due to funding 
constraints, could not come at a more opportune time. MAES promises to improve fault 
isolation, reduce reliance on overburdened technical representatives, and decrease 
unnecessary replacement of perfectly good repair parts. (Powell, 1993) All of these 
benefits offer considerable leverage to shipboard technicians who are tasked with 
maintaining a system that will receive few modifications or improvements over the 
system's remaining useful life. 
MAES offers shipboard fire control technicians a powerful tool to assist them in 
their daily efforts to support MK 92 Mod 2 FCS. However, without proper 
implementation, MAES could very easily be cast aside and its benefits never realized. 
Having the right system at the right time means nothing if the system is never used. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this thesis is to address the long-term implementation and 
deployment issues which should be considered prior to diffusion of MAES to applicable 
ships. It provides a three-tiered implementation plan for MAES. The plan covers MAES 
implementation to the fleet, integration into the formal training pipeline, and transition of 
life cycle support to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division (NSWC 
PHD). This plan could serve as a framework for future implementation projects if the 
MAES concept is expanded, and expert systems are developed for other maintenance 
intensive systems. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis pursues answers to three primary research questions which are 
generally analyzed according to hardware, documentation, training, and support 
requirements. 
1. What are the implementation issues for deploying the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS MAES to all 
MK 92 Mod 2 Ships? Specifically, what are the implementation issues with respect to: 
a. Hardware requirements 
b. Documentation requirements 
c. Training requirements 
d. Support requirements/procedures 
2. What are the requirements for integrating the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS MAES into the MK 
92 Mod 2 "C" School curriculum at Fleet Training Center (FTC), San Diego and Fleet 
Combat Training Center (FCTC), Dam Neck? Specifically, what are the implementation 
issues with respect to: 
a. Documentation requirements 
b. Hardware/Software requirements 
c. Course materials requirements 
3. What are the requirements for transitioning life cycle support for the MK 92 Mod 2 
FCS MAES software to NSWC PHD? Specifically, what are the implementation issues 
with respect to: 
a. Documentation requirements 
b. Hardware/Software requirements 
c. Training requirements 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis focuses on providing (1) an implementation and deployment plan for 
installing the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS MAES aboard all MK 92 Mod 2 ships; (2) an integration 
plan for incorporating the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS MAES into the MK 92 Mod 2 "C" School 
curriculum at the Fleet Training Centers; and (3) a transition plan for shifting life cycle 
support for the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS MAES software to NSWC PHD. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis contains six chapters and six appendices which are organized as 
follows: 
Chapter H, Building an Implementation Strategy, discusses the implementation 
factors and the risks that should be considered when developing the MAES deployment 
plan. 
Chapter m, Deploying MAES to all MK 92 Mod 2 FCS Ships, details the long- 
term implementation plan for MAES. The chapter covers hardware, documentation, 
training, and support requirements related to MAES's installation. 
Chapter IV, Integration of MAES into the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS "C" School 
Curriculum, discusses the on-going relationship between the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) and the Fleet Training Centers (FTC) with regards to MAES testing and 
evaluation. This chapter outlines the actions required to formally integrate MAES into the 
MK 92 Mod 2 FCS "C" School Curriculum. 
Chapter V, Transitioning Life Cycle Support for MAES to NSWC PHD, describes 
the documentation, software/hardware requirement, training requirements, maintenance 
procedures, and annual support costs associated with the transfer of MAES from NPS to 
NSWC PHD. 
Chapter VI, Summary and Conclusions, summarizes the author's conclusions 
regarding the long-term implementation issues related to the deployment of MAES. The 
implementation issues are discussed within the framework of the previously described 
three-tiered implementation plan. 
Appendix A, Fleet Training Center Laboratory Experiments with MAES, provides 
a description of the evaluation procedures and results of MAES performance tests 
conducted at Fleet Training Center, San Diego. 
Appendix B, Implementation Plan for Deploying MAES to all MK 92 Mod 2 FCS 
Ships, contains the implementation plan for deploying MAES to the ships. 
Appendix C, Integration Plan for Including MAES in the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS "C" 
School Curriculum, describes actions required to formally integrate MAES into the 
MK 92 Mod 2 FCS "C" School curriculum. 
Appendix D, MAES System Level Description, provides a preliminary version of 
one of the four documentation requirements needed by NSWC to maintain MAES. 
Appendix E, Forms, includes forms which might be used to report errors, 
recommend changes, or seek help. 
Appendix F, Software Transition Plan, provides a standard template for preparing 
software transition plans. 
Appendix G, Hardware, Software, and Documentation Requirements, provides a 
summary of anticipated hardware, software, and documentation requirements necessary to 
field MAES to ships, integrate it into the "C" school curriculum, and transition life cycle 
support for it to NSWC PHD. 

H. BUILDING AN IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
Building a long-term implementation strategy involves several steps. First, the 
risks associated with the project must be identified. Second, those factors important to a 
successful implementation plan must be targeted. And third, an implementation plan 
should be developed that mitigates the risks while focusing on the implementation factors 
most critical to success. 
This chapter begins with background information on risk management. Next, a 
risk management plan for deploying MAES is discussed. An analysis of the factors 
important to implementation success follows. This chapter concludes with a discussion of 
how implementation factors and risks should be incorporated into an implementation plan. 
B. BACKGROUND ON RISK MANAGEMENT 
Risk management is not a new discipline. Its origins can be traced back as far as 
the Babylonians, to around 3200 BC. (Boehm, 1989) Within DoD, risk management 
gained the attention of Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard in 1969 when he 
wrote that inadequate risk assessment was a major problem in the area of systems 
acquisition. In 1986, the General Accounting Office (GAO) cited deficiencies in the 
methodology used to assess technical risk within 25 program offices. GAO's review 
acted as the catalyst for more intense consideration of risk management throughout DoD. 
(DSMC, 1989) The Naval Doctrine Publication, Naval Warfare, also emphasizes the 
importance of effective risk management. (NDP, 1994) 
Though narrowly applied to implementation issues in the case of MAES, risk 
management is a process considered more broadly in areas such as systems acquisition, 
security planning, and software development. (DSMC, 1989; Rainer, et al, 1991) DoD 
acquisition policy regulations require program managers to continually assess program 
risks and emphasize the importance of understanding risks. (DoD Directive 5000.1, 1996) 
Even with a small project such as MAES, identifying and understanding risks can 
play an important part in the project's success.    Dart and Krasnov (1995) put the 
importance of risk management (RM) into perspective: 
RM is a key to successful change. It provides the foundation for the 
deployment team to make the right kinds of decisions when introducing change 
and prioritizing all the issues that need to be addressed. RM is a pro-active way of 
fostering positive change. It enables all the potential users of the new solution to 
get involved in the change at the earliest possible time and contribute their 
concerns and suggestions for risk mitigation strategies. (Dart and Krasnov, 1995) 
The terms "risk" and "risk management" mean different things to different people. 
As a result, a study of risk and risk management should begin by defining these terms as 
they will be applied to MAES implementation issues. 
Risk can be defined as "the probability of an undesirable event occurring and the 
significance of the consequence of occurrence." (DSMC, 1989) Expanding this definition, 
one can specify three key elements of risk, (1) the existence of an event that can cause 
change, (2) the event has some likelihood of occurrence, and (3) the event has some 
undesirable consequence.   Based on this expanded definition, risk can be controlled by 
either reducing the likelihood that a certain risk event will occur or by minimizing the 
impact of the event should it occur, or both. (Cleland, et al, 1993) 
Whether approached from a system acquisition, security, or software project 
perspective, risk is a complex concept subject to individual perception. (DSMC, 1989; 
Rainer, et al, 1991) Typically, risk is characterized by the fact that it is to some degree 
unknown, it changes with time, and it is manageable. The term "risk management" 
encompasses the processes used to manage risk. (DSMC, 1989) 
Risk management is "a method of managing that concentrates on identifying and 
controlling the areas or events that a have a potential for causing unwanted change." 
(Caver, 1985) For the risk management process to work, it must become "formal, 
systematic, and applied in a disciplined manner. (DSMC, 1989) Different approaches for 
dealing with risk are offered in the risk literature. (DSMC, 1989; Boehm, 1989; Cleland, 
et al, 1993) 
The various approaches or structures are typically very similar but they are not 
connected by standard terminology. Using different definitions to describe the same basic 
concepts creates confusion. (DSMC, 1989) To avoid miscommunication, a detailed 
description of expectations should be outlined prior to beginning the risk management 
process. (Cleland, et al, 1993) Selecting and describing a risk management structure will 
be the starting point for the MAES risk management plan. 
The risk management structure provided by the Defense Systems Management 
College (DSMC) and illustrated by Figure 2-1 will be used to analyze the risks associated 
with MAES's implementation. As shown in Figure 2-1, there are four essential activities 
associated with risk management. These activities include risk planning, risk assessment, 











Figure 2-1. Risk Management Structure (From DSMC, 1989) 
Planning for the management of risk aims to eliminate risk wherever possible, 
isolate and minimize risk, develop alternate courses of action, and establish a strategy for 
handling those risks that cannot be avoided. (DSMC, 1989) Research has shown that 
most software disaster projects could have been avoided or greatly reduced their 
problems, "if there had been an explicit early concern with identifying and resolving their 
high-risk elements." (Boehm, 1989) 
To have control over risk it is necessary to be fully informed about the risk and to 
have thought through the actions required to eliminate, minimize, or contain the effects of 
undesirable occurrences. (Hannsson, 1989; DSMC, 1989) As the first activity in the 
process, risk management planning forces "formal, systematic" thought about the 
objectives discussed above. (DSMC, 1989) 
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The next activity is risk assessment which involves two steps. The first step is risk 
identification which involves identifying the significant risks and then describing them in an 
understandable way. Techniques such as expert interviews and "lessons learned" 
comparisons are used in the assessment phase to develop narrative statements describing 
the program risks. (DSMC, 1989) 
Preliminary quantification is the second step in the risk assessment phase. The 
primary purpose of this step is to prioritize the identified risks through organization and 
stratification. Neither the risk planning phase nor the risk assessment phase requires heavy 
mathematical study; however, some baseline for rating risks should be created to eliminate 
ambiguity. A simple rating scheme is preferred. (DSMC, 1989) 
The next phase of risk management concerns risk analysis. Difficult to clearly 
separate from the risk assessment phase, this phase involves issues such as the 
consequences if the risk becomes reality and the available ways of dealing with it. The 
most useful product of this phase is a risk watchlist which acts as a handy tool for tracking 
risk activities. (DSMC, 1989) 
The final activity in the risk management process is risk handling which is the 
process of taking actions to mitigate or eliminate the unwanted results of risk. The actions 
describing risk handling techniques can be categorized as avoidance, control, assumption, 
transfer, and knowledge and research. (DSMC, 1989) 
Selecting a lower risk choice from several alternatives represents a risk avoidance 
decision.    The most common of the risk handling techniques, risk control involves the 
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continual monitoring and adjustment of a program based on a risk reduction plan. While 
risk assumption represents a decision to accept some consequences, risk transfer includes 
those actions taken to reduce risk exposure by sharing the risk with someone else. 
(DSMC, 1989) 
Even though it is not a "true" risk handling technique, knowledge and research 
provides information in support of the other techniques and serves as a reminder that risk 
management is a continual process. (DSMC, 1989) The risk management process should 
be viewed as a continuous loop representing a never ending process. (Cleland, et al, 
1993) 
C.        MAES RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN 
The MAES risk management plan will generally follow the risk management 
structure shown in Figure 2-1. The risk planning phase will not be specifically addressed 
since the risk management background discussion adequately covers the activities 
comprising this phase. The MAES risk management plan begins with the risk assessment 
phase. 
1.        Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment involves two steps.   The first step is risk identification and the 
second step is preliminary quantification. 
a.        Bisk Identification 
Risk identification requires that significant risks be identified and described 
in an understandable way. Part of the risk identification phase involves activities such as 
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expert interviews and "lessons learned" comparisons. Risk identification was begun for 
the MAES project by discussing "risks" with Susan Dart of Continuus Software, an expert 
in the field of software configuration risk management. "Lessons learned" comparisons 
were derived from conversations with NSWC Louisville representatives, U.S. Army 
Research Laboratory engineers, and NAVSEA engineers about their respective 
experiences with expert systems implementations. 
Categorizing the risks simplifies the process of risk identification and will 
be expanded during the second step to develop a risk rating scheme. According to Dart 
(1996) risks can be grouped into three categories - technical, people, and organizational. 
Based on these categories we identify the risks associated with MAES as follows (Dart 
andKrasnov, 1995; Dart, 1996): 
Technical Risks - evolve around the software development and 
maintenance environment and the structure of the user's applications. 
• Knowledge Accuracy. Knowledge accuracy concerns the domain expert's 
rendering of his knowledge in a manner that is both technically accurate and 
consistent with accepted troubleshooting practices. 
• Maintainability. Maintainability risks involve how easily the software can be 
updated with improvements or corrections and the effort required to keep all 
versions of MAES current. 
• Software Reliability/Quality/Availability. This multiple risk represents the need 
for the software to readily provide results which can be trusted as the best 
possible troubleshooting solutions. 
• Supportability. Supportability risk has two dimensions, one internal and one 
external to the MAES project. The internal supportability risk comes from the 
uncertain budgetary environment surrounding MK92. The external 
supportability risk comes from SoftSell, the software company that created the 
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expert system developmental software used to build MAES. If SoftSell drops 
support of this software or goes out of business it could complicate future 
supportability. 
• Hardware Durability in a Shipboard Environment. Hardware durability is a 
risk because of the numerous harsh elements, such as electromagnetic 
interference (EMI), high heat, frequent power surges, water, and corrosives, 
which are common in a shipboard environment. Fielding MAES on a 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) laptop computer raises the risk that that the 
COTS laptop will be too fragile for a shipboard environment. 
• Knowledge and Program Documentation. Knowledge and program 
documentation risk pertains to the accuracy and completeness of the written 
references available to support the knowledge represented by the software and 
the format of the underlying software development program. 
• Data Gathering. The data gathering risk stems from the desire to collect data 
after MAES is fielded to illustrate the impact of MAES. The risk comes from 
historically low survey response rates and from the difficulty in selecting a 
metric which can quantitatively reflect MAES's impact. 
People    Risks    -    evolve    around    incorrect    expectations,     poor 
communications, fear and lack of knowledge. 
• Computer Literacy. This risk arises from the possibility that some of the Fire 
Control (FC) technicians will not be familiar with computers and/or the 
Windows® environment. 
• Technical Representative Resistance. Driven to some extent by perceptions, 
this risk encompasses the possibility that technical representatives (or tech 
reps) will resist this technology because they feel that MAES challenges their 
expert authority or they believe that MAES is designed to replace them. The 
very limited role the tech reps played in the development of MAES may also 
contribute to their resistance. 
• Fire Control Technician Resistance. The risk from the FC's is that they will 
not freely change their troubleshooting paradigm and consequently MAES will 
not be used. More experienced FC's may be committed to "the way it's 
always been done" or they may simply enjoy the challenge of isolating faults on 
their own.  Additionally, senior FC's, who have always relied on the technical 
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manuals or technical representatives for guidance, may not trust MAES or 
encourage its use. 
• Hierarchical Resistance. This risk deals with the political considerations 
inherent in the Navy's hierarchical structure which makes individuals sensitive 
to seemingly minor issues and peripheral concerns. 
• Attitude Towards Change. This risk weaves through every element of this 
project that involves people. If decision makers and potential users of MAES 
are not open minded about the possibilities of this technology then this project 
and any future projects that might advocate this technology are jeopardized. 
Organizational Risks - evolve around organizational politics and boundaries 
and cultural change. 
• Chain-of-Command Support. This risk arises because the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) operates outside of the chain-of-command normally associated 
with fielding production level systems to the fleet. In dealing with the various 
commands, such as Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), 
COMNAVSURFLANT, COMNAVSURFPAC, CINCLANTFLT,' 
CINCPACFLT, Fleet Training Center (FTC), San Diego, Fleet Combat 
Training Center (FCTC), Dam Neck, NSWC PHD, Fleet Technical Support 
Center, Atlantic (FTSCLANT) and Pacific (FTSCPAC), and the various ships, 
the MAES deployment team must establish its own credibility while 
concurrently building support for MAES. The risk is that one or more of the 
commands will withhold their support of MAES because of concerns about the 
program or NPS's role in the development. 
. • Fleet Training Centers' (FTC) Acceptance and Adoption. As the front-line 
trainers of FC technicians, the FTC's create the students' first image of MAES. 
First impressions are important. Risk arises if the training centers do not 
accept and readily advocate MAES as a useful troubleshooting tool. 
• Fleet Technical Support Center (FTSC) Endorsement. FTSC representatives 
work closely with the ships in providing troubleshooting assistance for more 
complex problems and generally are well-respected for their technical 
expertise. Because of their role as technical experts who work closely with 
shipboard technicians, they pose a risk to MAES if they do not endorse it as a 
viable troubleshooting tool. If they do not accept MAES then it is unlikely that 
shipboard technicians will trust the system. 
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• System Use by Fire Control Technicians. This risk lies with the older, more 
experienced FC's who may not trust MAES or may feel that they do not need 
MAES. Negative attitudes on the part of experienced FC's may create 
sufficient pressure to keep junior FC's from using MAES. 
• MAES Deployment Training. The transient nature of Navy personnel 
combined with ship deployments create the risk that personnel will not receive 
proper MAES training. 
• Deployment Funding. While MAES is funded through evaluation at 
COMNAVSURFLANT, funding for deployment is not a certainty. 
Deployment funding will include funding to field MAES - (computers and 
training), funding to transition MAES to the Post-Deployment System Support 
(PDSS) activity and the FTC's, and funding to rework the evaluation software 
to a production system. 
b.        Preliminary Quantification 
Preliminary quantification is the second step in the risk assessment phase. 
The primary purpose of this step is to prioritize the identified risks through a simple rating 
scheme. The rating scheme for the deployment of MAES contains four risk classifications 
which are described below: 
• 
• 
Class I: Event poses a minor threat to the success of MAES. Little 
management attention is necessary to overcome this risk. 
Class II: Event poses a moderate threat to the success of MAES. Active 
management attention and monitoring is required to overcome this risk. 
Class III: Event poses a significant threat to the success of MAES. Close 
management attention and monitoring is required to overcome this risk. 
Improper treatment of this risk could jeopardize the project. 
Class IV: Event poses an extreme threat to the success of MAES. Regardless 
of management attention, the occurrence of this event will jeopardize the 
project. 
16 
In applying these risk classifications to the applicable events the 
consequence of occurrence has been incorporated into the classification while the 
likelihood of occurrence will be subjectively considered as the specific events are 
classified. Table I illustrates the results of subjectively rating each risk on a scale of one to 
five, one being low and five being high, for the risk elements, likelihood of occurrence and 
consequences of occurrence. Ratings were determined based on interviews, historical 
trends, and risk literature. By no means scientific, the purpose of this classification 
scheme is merely to provide a method for organizing risks. 
Based on the combined risk elements' scores shown in Table I, risks are 
classified as either Class I, II, III, or IV risks. Class I risks are those risks with combined 
risk elements' scores between three and five. Class H risks are those risks with combined 
risk elements' scores of six or seven. Class IE risks are those risks with combined risk 
elements' scores of eight or nine. Class IV risks are those risks with combined risk 
elements' score often. Table II summarizes the risk classifications. Note that no class IV 
risks exist for MAES. Also note that even though there are more technical risks than 
people or organizational risks, the risk classification results show that more managerial 
attention should be focused on the people and organizational issues. 
As an overview of how ratings were assigned to the risk elements consider 
the following examples. Hardware durability, a Class I risk, received a likelihood of 
occurrence score of one and a consequences of occurrence score of four for a combined 
risk elements' score of five.   While numerous harsh elements found in the shipboard 
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environment threaten COTS equipment, personal experience has shown that COTS 
computers are far more durable than one would expect and thus the likelihood of this risk 
occurring is minimal. Alternatively, if the risk does occur, meaning the hardware is 
unreliable, the consequences will be severe. 
Fire Control Technician resistance, a Class II risk, received a likelihood of 
occurrence score of two and a consequences of occurrence score of four for a combined 
risk elements' score of six. Feedback received from fire controlmen at FTC, San Diego, 
and aboard the MAES prototype test ship, reveals that sailors will be receptive to MAES 
which indicates that the likelihood of occurrence for this risk is small. If the risk does 
occur the consequences could be severe since resistance would equate to non-use of 
MAES. 
Chain-of-Command support, a Class m risk, received a likelihood of 
occurrence score of three and a consequences of occurrence score of five for a combined 
risk elements' score of eight. At least ten different commands, including several different 
departments within a few of the commands, will be involved in the deployment of MAES. 
The large number of individuals and commands representing their own interests creates a 
likelihood that one or more of the commands will withhold full support of MAES. If this 
occurs support from other commands may fall like dominoes. 
As a possible scenario, suppose that either the Fleet Combat Training 
Center (FCTC), Dam Neck or the Fleet Technical Support Center (FTSC), Atlantic does 
not   folly   support   MAES.      Without   the   endorsement   of FCTC   and/or  FTSC, 
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COMNAVSURFLANT would probably withdraw their sponsorship of MAES. Risk 
literature clearly specifies that full management support is required for implementation 
success. If MAES does not receive full chain-of-command support the consequences 
could be devastating. (Bradley and Häuser, 1995) 
With more experience implementing expert systems, it might be desirable 
to develop risk templates that define risk areas and the likelihood and consequence of 
risks' occurrence based on past experience. McDonnell Douglas Aerospace uses such an 
approach to develop risk templates that can be applied to common risks among different 
software projects. The templates are used to assign a value of low, minor, moderate, 
significant, or high to the likelihood and consequence of occurrence for each risk. These 
values are entered into a two-dimensional matrix to determine the risk level. By relying on 
past experience, this approach removes some of the subjectivity inherent in determining 
risk levels. (Mason and Boyd, 1995) 
2.        Risk Analysis 
Issues such as the consequences if the risk becomes reality and the available ways 
of dealing with it are tackled during the risk analysis phase. Using the risk classifications 
from Table II, risks requiring the most resources are discussed first. Due to time and 
funding constraints risk prioritization is necessary so that efforts can be focused on the 
areas that provide the greatest return. 
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Risk Elements 
Likelihood of ;!::;CMsepehceS:öTi::;i 
Risk Occurrence ":;;i:-:;I;!iS^iri^e^;l!;!l:: ;-::Sco:re;:l 
Knowledge Accuracy 3 3 6 
Maintainability 2 4 ,  6 
S/W rel/qual/avail 2 5 7 
Supportability 2 2 4 
H/W durability 1 4 5 
Documentation 1 3 4 
Data Gathering 3 2 5 
Computer Literacy 1 2 3 
Tech Rep Resistance 5 4 9 
FC Tech Resistance 2 4 6 
Hierarchical Resistance 3 5 8 
Attitude Towards Change 3 3 6 
Chain-of-Command Support 3 5 8 
Training Center Acceptance 
and Adoption 1 4 5 
FTSC Endorsement 3 5 8 
System Use by FC's 3 5 8 
MAES Deployment Training 4 4 8 
Deployment Funding 3 5 8 
Table I. MAES Risk Element Ratings 
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Risk Category Risk Classification 
Technical Knowledge Accuracy n 
Maintainability n 
S/W reliability/quality/availability n 
Supportability i_ 
H/W durability i 
Documentation i 
Data Gathering i 
People Computer Literacy 
Technical Representative Resistance 
Fire Control Technician Resistance 
Hierarchical Resistance 






Organizational Chain-of-Command Support 
Training Center Acceptance and Adoption 
FTSC Endorsement 
System Use by FC's 








1 able H. MAES Risk Classification Table 
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Class III Risks: 
• Technical Representative (Tech Rep) Resistance. Already a reality to some 
extent, tech rep resistance remains a volatile issue. Several tech reps at both 
FTSCLANT and FTSCPAC are skeptical of MAES because it professes to 
perform skills similar to their own yet they were largely excluded from the 
initial MAES development process. 
If MAES proves itself on the ships then this risk can be expected to 
gradually erode; however, if MAES turns out to be riddled with errors or 
controversial procedures, tech rep resistance will likely solidify against MAES. 
If tech rep resistance grows then fleet use of MAES will probably suffer and 
future support for MAES will diminish. 
The best way to counter this risk is to establish open and honest 
communications with the FTSC tech reps. As important links to the fleet, tech 
reps should be aggressively pursued for their opinions of MAES. Whether 
positive or negative, their comments are valuable. Their criticisms can be used 
to improve MAES and their positive comments will help MAES gain fleet 
acceptance. 
In addition, seeking the active involvement of the tech reps in 
expanding the knowledge of MAES would include them as part of the 
development process. This could significantly reduce their resistance to 
MAES. Long-term, the tech reps could become the best source for updates 
and changes to MAES. 
• Hierarchical Resistance. Minor issues or peripheral considerations may heavily 
impact the way that MAES is eventually implemented. Sensitivity to the 
special concerns of all involved activities, even those just remotely involved, 
will be important during the early implementation stages. Should someone feel 
that they have not been properly informed on some matter the entire 
implementation effort could be stalled and further support could be 
jeopardized. 
As one example, an early conversation about implementation issues 
with a CINCLANTFLT representative indicated that CINCLANTFLT was not 
familiar with the MAES project and should be fully informed prior to fielding 
the system to any east coast ships. Another conversation with a FTSC 
representative indicated concerns about the accuracy of MAES. This concern 
surfaced during casual conversation and could have easily gone unvoiced. Its 
ramifications are potentially very serious. 
This risk can be handled by first identifying all commands that might 
have an interest in MAES. These commands should be kept informed about the 
project and periodically solicited for comments and concerns. 
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Chain-of-Command support. NAVSEA, FCTC Dam Neck, FTC, San Diego 
FTSCLANT, FTSCPAC, CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT' 
COMNAVSURFLANT, COMNAVSURFPAC, NSWC PHD, and the various 
ships are all players in the fielding of this system. Each command has its own 
expectations of MAES. When MAES software development and fielding 
studies migrated from NSWC PHD to the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) a 
paradigm shift occurred. 
Internally, little changed; but externally the shift created new 
relationships founded on unfamiliar turf. The type commanders' staffs, the 
technical support commands, and even the training centers were familiar with 
NAVSEA and NSWC and understood their relationship. Since NPS rarely 
develops production level systems our involvement has created a new inlet to 
an old, well-established pipeline. 
This situation creates risks which may have been resolved long ago 
between the established players but resurface as the MAES development team 
attempts to build support and enthusiasm for the system. If one or more of 
these commands withholds support for MAES, the project could be placed in jeopardy. 
One way to counter this risk is to more actively associate the project 
with NSWC PHD instead of NPS. With NPS as the software developer, 
individuals from various commands might silently wonder where NPS gets the 
technical expertise to be involved in the MAES project. While this seems 
absurd to someone with fiill information about the MAES effort, it may seem 
like a completely valid concern to someone with limited knowledge about 
MAES. Silent concerns like these pose a significant risk but can be overcome 
by aggressive marketing and education. Presentations should discuss the roles 
of NAVSEA, NSWC PHD, and NPS. 
FTSC Endorsement. This is perhaps the most influential risk of the entire 
project. This organizational risk is closely coupled to the people risk, tech rep 
resistance, discussed above. Without FTSC acceptance, adoption, and 
advocacy, it is unlikely that the sailors will assimilate MAES into' their 
troubleshooting repertoire. This will occur for at least two reasons. 
First, if the FTSCs do not accept MAES, then other commands, such as 
the type commanders, might be reluctant to fully support MAES. Second, if 
the FTSCs do not endorse MAES, sailors may be reluctant to use the system. 
System Use by FC's. The risk lies with the older more experienced FC's who 
may not trust MAES or may feel that they do not need MAES. Negative 
attitudes on the part of experienced FC's may create sufficient pressure to keep 
junior FC's from using MAES. If this risk becomes reality then the benefits of 
MAES will never be realized. 
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The most effective way to deal with this risk is to aggressively build 
support throughout the chain-of-command by emphasizing the many benefits 
of MAES. Gaining FTSC's endorsement of MAES also reduces the risk. The 
most effective way to mitigate both the FTSC endorsement and the system use 
risks would be for the FTSC representatives to ask sailors if they used MAES 
prior to calling for assistance. 
• MAES Deployment Training. Much effort will be focused on providing quality 
training to each ship as MAES is introduced. Unfortunately, due to the 
transient nature of shipboard personnel, much of this training may not be 
passed on to newcomers who might have been transferred from a command 
without MAES or deployed during the MAES fielding. As the FC's with 
MAES experience and training transfer, the "corporate" knowledge about how 
to use MAES may lapse. 
To decrease this risk, MAES deployment training must be designed so 
that it perpetuates itself. Simply providing initial implementation training and 
then including MAES training in the work center's training plan may be 
inadequate to ensure that MAES training and experience are passed down to 
remaining technicians as others transfer. 
To ensure system use and to encourage ongoing training, some expert 
systems have been listed as tools to be used during routine Preventive 
Maintenance System (PMS) checks,. (Pandit, 1996) Another solution might 
be to require Casualty Report (CASREP) comments concerning the use or 
non-use of MAES. 
• Deployment Funding. Deployment funding risk arises if after the evaluation 
period funding is not forthcoming to deploy the production version of MAES. 
Without adequate deployment funding, the MAES project will end, depriving 
the fleet of a valuable troubleshooting tool. 
An effective marketing campaign that emphasizes the benefits and cost 
savings of MAES, while highlighting the results from evaluation tests of the 
calibration module at FTC, San Diego, provides the best approach for handling 
this risk. This project's long history of austere funding suggests that 
deployment funding will be obtained only after great expenditure of time and 
effort. Optimistic hope is the only thing preventing deployment funding from 
being a Class IV risk. 
Class II Risks: 
• Knowledge Accuracy. Due to the complexity of the knowledge contained in 
MAES, it is likely that there will be errors. Even without errors, different 
experts will propose different ways to accomplish the same tasks.    The 
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consequences of knowledge inaccuracies depend on the frequency and 
seriousness of the discrepancies. Numerous minor problems or a few serious 
problems could jeopardize the program's credibility and greatly frustrate users 
especially if feedback channels are not responsive to problem reports. 
This risk can be minimized by encouraging close scrutiny of MAES 
during the prototype phase. In the long-term, this risk should be dealt with by 
establishing responsive, user-friendly feedback channels connecting all MAES 
users. 
A configuration management board, comprised of representatives from 
NSWC PHD, FTSCLANT, and FTSCPAC, could be convened on an semi- 
annual or annual basis to groom the MAES program. With NSWC PHD as the 
coordinator, e-mail between the board members could support an ongoing 
dialogue about MAES. 
Maintainability. Identified as one of the elements which killed off expert 
systems, maintainability problems could cripple MAES if the system becomes 
either too expensive or too time consuming to maintain. (Davenport, 1995) 
Maintainability applies to the time, effort, and expense required to keep the 
expert system software updated with the changes pertinent to all of the various 
versions for different equipment configurations. 
Fortunately, the maintainability risk has already been mitigated by 
several factors. First, MAES has been designed with maintainability in mind. 
Multi-media features, such as videos, were not incorporated into MAES 
because of the time and expense required to update them. 
Second, MK 92 Mod 2 FCS is expected to have few modifications to 
the system. This greatly reduces the potential software maintenance tasks by 
effectively restricting maintenance issues to the program as fielded. 
Third, the graphical displays developed with the expert system 
developmental shell closely resemble the structure of the knowledge 
documentation provided by the domain expert. These close ties make it easier 
for.someone performing maintenance to correlate program changes with 
supporting software documentation. 
Last, the modular design of MAES simplifies maintenance by limiting 
the scope of the updates or corrections. Beyond these considerations, 
maintainability risk can be decreased by ensuring that the fielded system's 
annual maintenance budget is adequately funded. NPS estimates annual life- 
cycle support costs at $50,000 to $100,000. 
Software Reliability/Quality/Availability. If software reliability, quality and/or 
availability becomes a problem then MAES will likely be discarded by sailors 
as they lose trust in the system. Measures such as prototype evaluations, 
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• 
independent validation and verifications, and reasonable developmental 
scheduling have been employed to diminish this risk. 
Feedback from the prototype version, which has been in use by several 
activities for over a year, indicates that the reliability/quality/availability risk 
may be minimal. As more activities begin to use MAES on a more frequent 
basis, this risk could increase. 
If feedback shows that this risk is increasing, then aggressive steps 
should be taken to publicize known problems and to provide timely 
corrections. As Intel learned from their Pentium® chip error fiasco, even 
minor problems can explode into damaging episodes if not properly handled. 
Fleet Training Center Acceptance and Adoption. An important link to the fleet 
will be jeopardized if this risk becomes reality. Much has already been done to 
mitigate this risk. FTC San Diego continues to be an active participant in this 
project which provides sailors with very early exposure to MAES. 
Some risk still 
exists here since FCTC Dam Neck has only recently begun working with 
MAES. Failure to win FCTC Dam Neck's endorsement could be a fatal blow 
to the MAES project since the training center will be one of the activities to 
which SURFLANT looks for input about MAES. 
Close liaison should continue with the training centers to ensure that 
any concerns they have about MAES are properly addressed. Since the 
training centers offer junior FC's their first exposure to MAES, they are in an 
ideal position to identify problems that first time users of MAES might have. 
Fire Control Technician Resistance. For this risk to pose a serious threat to 
MAES, other factors such as lack of support from the chain-of-command or 
poor FTSC acceptance would have to occur. Given that MAES performs as 
advertised and absent any negatively contributing factors, this risk could be 
expected to gradually diminish as positive information from the users of MAES 
spreads to others. 
The timesaving aspects of MAES should be discussed during 
implementation training. One of the few incentives available to motivate 
sailors is liberty. If MAES saves them time, they will use it. 
Attitude Towards Change. This risk ties into the other risks concerning 
resistance but provides a more general approach to the problem. Though 
seemingly trivial, people's attitudes towards change can pose a significant risk 
to this project. The best way to deal with this risk is to include a plan for 
facilitating change in the implementation strategy. 
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Class I Risks: 
• Supportability. Uncertainty surrounds the supportability of MAES both 
because of the volatile nature of many software companies and because of the 
decreased funding and billets assigned to support MK 92. 
There are no assurances that, SoftSell, the company that designed the 
expert system shell will continue to support their older products. If this risk 
arises then MAES may become locked into the Windows® 3.1 or Windows 
95® operating environment where over time software problems may be 
identified but are unrepairable. 
Similarly, there are no guarantees that NSWC will have the software 
personnel to support MAES in the long-term. 
Depending on the effort required to support MAES, there may not be adequate 
funding to fully support MAES' s upkeep. 
The risk with SoftSell should be dealt with by obtaining all available 
information and documentation about the developmental tool from SoftSell 
and by vigorously tracking all trouble reports submitted to them. The risk with 
NSWC support can be decreased, but not eliminated, by ensuring that MAES 
maintenance is included in the tasking for overall MK 92 support. 
• Hardware Durability. If COTS laptops prove to be too fragile for the harsh 
elements found in a shipboard environment, then MAES users could become 
prejudiced against MAES based on hardware problems rather than software 
performance. In short, frustration with the hardware could lead to non-use. 
This risk might be diminished by fielding MAES on ruggedized 
computers. While ruggedized computers might be more durable than COTS 
computers, especially in a shipboard environment, the high cost of ruggedized 
computers might be prohibitive for the activity that funds MAES's deployment. 
One alternative approach would be for the In-service Support 
Engineering Activity (ISEA), NSWC PHD, to purchase replacement COTS 
laptops with funds that would have been used for ruggedized computers. This 
would allow for a phased replacement type of laptop purchase rather than a 
one-time expenditure for ruggedized computers that may be no more reliable 
than COTS computers. As the failure rate of the COTS laptops becomes 
known then additional replacement computers could be purchased. Based on 
personal experience, COTS laptops will prove to be far sturdier than one 
would expect. 
The intent of this approach would be to ensure that hardware problems 
do not jeopardize the successful deployment of MAES. This would not be a 
long-term commitment on the part of the ISEA. After an introductory period 
of six to nine months, hardware maintenance responsibilities would shift to the 
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ships. The fielding plan calls for the laptops to be designated as test equipment 
with replacement responsibilities residing with the ships. 
• Documentation. This risk ties not only to short-term program accuracy but 
also to long-term maintainability. Without adequate documentation, MAES 
will be difficult to update/upgrade which will hinder life cycle support efforts. 
The most desirable way to deal with this risk is to ensure that adequate 
documentation exists before the MAES software is transitioned to NSWC. 
Documentation is discussed in Chapter V of this paper. 
• Data Gathering. If data gathering materializes as a risk, it could affect future 
MAES enhancements or the development of other expert systems, as benefits 
of the system will be hard to prove. 
An inexpensive way to deal with this risk would be to have thesis 
students analyze MK 92 Mod 2 maintenance data before and after MAES. 
Another method would be to look at repair parts demand information for MK 
92 Mod 2 before and after MAES implementation. Repair parts demand 
information is available from the Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP), 
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. 
• Computer Literacy. While FC's are some of the most technically oriented 
people on a ship, there are no guarantees that they will all feel comfortable 
using a computer. If some of the FC's feel uncomfortable using the computer, 
MAES use may suffer or the tool may be monopolized by those FC's familiar 
with computers. 
The ways to counter this risk are to provide brief computer training 
during implementation training and to include explicit instructions in the users' 
manual about computer basics. Over time this risk will diminish as new MK 
92 Mod 2 FCS "C" school graduates, who have received introductory 
computer training at one of the fleet training centers, reach the fleet. 
Review of the above risks and their classifications reveals that many of the 
risks, especially Class III risks, are highly interdependent.    They are interdependent in 
terms of how they should be handled and in that success or failure in one area can lead to 
a similar outcome in another area .    For example, the tech reps' opinions of MAES will 
impact whether the FTSC's endorse MAES. The tech reps' opinions could also influence 
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whether or not the sailors use MAES. Without the backing of the FTSC's, 
COMNAVSURFLANT and COMNAVSURFPAC are unlikely to support MAES. If the 
type commanders do not support MAES then the fleet commanders will certainly not 
support MAES. 
Thus, if the deployment team does not gain tech reps' support, the 
interdependencies among the risks including tech rep resistance, hierarchical resistance, 
chain-of-command support, FTSC endorsement, and system use by fire controlmen, could 
cause support for MAES to unravel. Any strategy to handle these risks should leverage 
the interdependencies to optimize risk mitigation outcomes while economizing project 
resources. In the above example, the tech reps represent the greatest leverage point. 
3.        Risk Handling 
Risk handling is the final activity in the risk management process. Risk handling 
involves techniques such as avoidance, control, assumption, and transfer to mitigate or 
eliminate the unwanted results of risks. (DSMC, 1989) 
As a brief review of these terms, risk avoidance involves selecting a lower risk 
choice from several alternatives. Risk control includes the continual monitoring and 
adjustment of a program, while risk assumption suggests that some consequences will be 
accepted. Finally, risk transfer entails reducing risk exposure by sharing the risk with 
another activity. 
Applying these four handling techniques to MAES risks would show that all of the 
Class II and Class III risks fall under the risk control handling technique. By definition, 
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Class II and Class HI risks require close management attention and monitoring which are 
essential elements of the risk control handling technique. Controlling risk includes "the use 
of reviews, risk reduction milestones, development of fallback positions," and other 
management actions which should be part of an overall risk reduction plan. (DSMC, 
1989) 
The underlying assumption about risk control is that an awareness exists about 
certain risks and there is a flexible plan for dealing with those risks. Preliminary 
quantification provides the initial "awareness" of the risks while extracting the common 
elements generates the starting point for a risk reduction plan. 
With respect to risk control, Class HI risks share two common leverage points: 
communication and perception. Essential to mitigating Class III . risks, open 
communications serve to build alliances and uncover negative undercurrents before they 
become threats. Perceptions influence such risks as tech rep and FC resistance, chain-of- 
command support, FTSC endorsement, and attitude towards change. An effective 
marketing campaign can cultivate beneficial perceptions about MAES and breakdown the 
silent barriers created by perceptions which might threaten the project. Experts 
throughout the software development industry agree that marketing is a crucial part of any 
implementation plan. (Dart, 1996; Fowler, 1996) In this case, it can also be an important 
part of the MAES risk reduction plan. 
Risk assumption can be appropriate in some situations. For MAES, some risk 
assumption      occurs      in     the      areas     of     knowledge      accuracy,      software 
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rekabwty/quality/availability, supportability, hardware durability, and data gathering. Risk 
control and risk assumption techniques are actually combined to handle knowledge 
accuracy and software reliabiüty/quality/availabiHty risks. This happens because despite 
our best efforts at controlling these risks, some risk will persist that we must eventually 
accept. 
Computer literacy risk and perhaps hardware durability risk could be handled with 
risk avoidance techniques. Computer literacy risk could be avoided by providing more 
extensive computer training. Hardware durability risk might be avoided by procuring 
ruggedized rather than COTS laptop computers. 
4.        The Risk Management Plan 
The activities described above form the foundation for the risk management plan 
which will be integrated into the overall MAES implementation plan. Identification of 
those factors important to implementation success is the next step in developing an 
implementation plan. 
Because of the many definitions of risk, one could argue that risks and factors 
important to implementation success are closely related. For this analysis, factors differ 
from risks in that factors are more system specific and risks are more project specific. 
D.        FACTORS IMPORTANT TO IMPLEMENTATION SUCCESS 
Some information systems professionals suggest that Expert Systems (ES) are 
dead. At least three factors including maintainability, justifying the use of dedicated 
platforms, and implementation are cited as problem areas. (Davenport, 1995) Experience 
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has shown that implementing new technology is usually more difficult than we expect. 
(Davenport, 1995) Given the importance of implementation, this section will explore the 
various factors which determine an implementation plan's success or failure. 
1.        Framework for the Implementation Strategy 
If a generic implementation strategy existed for deploying technological 
innovations, such as expert systems, it would likely need to be tailored to the particular 
characteristics of the specific system (Meyer and Curley, 1991). Meyer and Curley (1991) 
have built a two dimensional framework for evaluating the characteristics of various 
expert systems. They classify expert systems based on knowledge complexity and 
technological complexity. 
Measures of complexity are determined by incorporating a number of factors into 
each dimension.  Knowledge complexity includes such factors as the number of separate 
areas of expertise needed to deal with a problem, the amount of training and experience 
required of an expert, and the nature of the system's output.   Technological complexity 
considers such factors as the number of rules or the size of the knowledge base, the 
diversity of information sources, and the degree of diffusion of users of the system. 
(Meyer & Curley, 1991) 
Based on the measure of complexity for the two dimensions, Meyer and Curley 
(1991) classify expert systems (ES) into one of four quadrants.   Figure 2-2 graphically 
depicts the classification. The four quadrants are described below: 
I. Low knowledge/low technology. Since these ES contain the lowest levels of 
both technology and knowledge, they can often be developed by end users and deployed 
on stand-alone PC's. They generally represent a few hundred rules at most. 
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n. High knowledge/low technology. Based on "deep" knowledge, these ES 
capture detailed knowledge from domain experts that can cover several complex domains. 
Nonetheless, they can be deployed on stand-alone PC's which might support small 
databases. 
in. Low knowledge/high technology. These ES are based on simple knowledge 
requirements. The complexity in these systems comes from the considerable system 
integration challenges which can involve hundreds of different locations. 
IV. High knowledge/high technology. Based on knowledge that is both "broad" 
and "deep" these ES often require complex efforts in areas like database management and 
systems integration. 





























Low High Technology Complexity 
Figure 2-2. Information Systems Complexity Matrix 
(From Meyer and Curley, 1991) 
Efforts aimed at categorizing a number (50 in this example) of different 
knowledge-based systems indicate that these systems fall into all four categories. (Meyer 
and Curley, 1991) Given this tendency, a single implementation plan would not be 
appropriate for all systems. (Bradley and Häuser, 1995) 
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2.        Implementation Factors 
An important element in implementation planning appears to be correctly 
categorizing the ES as early as possible so that implementation efforts can be customized 
to fit the system. A precursor to categorization would be identifying key factors and 
activities within the four categories which are important to ES implementation success. 
Factors expected to influence user acceptance of a technological innovation, such as an 
ES, can be classified based on innovation characteristics, organizational influences, and 
individual differences. (Bradley and Häuser, 1995) 
Innovation characteristics concern the users' perceptions of the innovation. A 
person who has a strong negative attitude about computer technology could be expected 
to have a negative attitudes towards an expert system. (Bradley and Häuser, 1995) 
Similarly, if something in the implementation process creates unrealistic expectations in the 
users, they can become resistant to change and jeopardize the implementation. (Bradley 
and Häuser, 1995) 
Organizational influences include such factors as user participation in development 
and implementation, rewards for using the system, training, and informal and formal 
organizational support. From these factors, user involvement in the development process 
and availability of training have been shown to be very positive influences on 
implementation success. (Bradley and Häuser, 1995) However, not everyone agrees that 
user participation in development or implementation plays a significant role in 
implementation success (Ginzberg, 1981; Markus and Keil, 1994). 
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While the support of top management is important to implementation success, 
supervisor's desires and peer influences can also be controlling factors in the 
implementation process. (Leonard-Barton, 1987) Supervisors' attitudes towards a new 
ES can either accelerate or hinder the diffusion of the innovation among users. (Bradley 
and Häuser, 1995) In situations where peers are actively involved, they can help speed 
acceptance of the ES if they hold positive beliefs about the ES. (Leonard-Barton, 1987) 
With regard to individual differences and their impact on implementation success, 
factors from job tenure to cosmopolitanism have been shown to have an effect on the 
implementation process. The degree to which individual differences influence users of ES 
depends on the perceived change created by the ES. User resistance might be expected to 
be high based on a particular set of individual characteristics, but user perceptions of the 
change could completely invalidate expectations. (Bradley and Häuser, 1995). 
Bradley and Häuser (1995) state that "the manner in which the implementation is 
managed impacts both the users' perceptions of the system and the speed of its diffusion 
among the user group." Borrowing from Meyer and Curley (1991) and incorporating the 
factors described above, Bradley and Häuser (1995) offer a framework for determining 
which factors should be emphasized for each of the four classes of ES. Table m provides 
an overview of this framework. 
The success of any implementation plan aimed at introducing new technology 
depends heavily on an effective marketing or sales campaign (Leonard-Barton, 1987; Dart, 
1996; Fowler, 1996).  A practical way to approach a new implementation challenge is to 
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identify those factors which will most influence user acceptance of the innovation and then 
focus on those factors. In resource constrained organizations this approach can help 





I n m IV 
Innovation Characteristics 
User perception of computing technology H H H H 
User perception of expert systems L M M H 
Organizational influences 
User involvement in ES design H H H H 
User involvement in ES implementation H H H H 
Reward structure L M M H 
Training L M M H 
Top management support L M M H 
Supervisor support H H H H 
Advocates L M M H 
Consulting aids L M M M 
Individual differences 
User perception of change H H H H 
L = Low emphasis in the implementation plan 
M = Medium emphasis in the implementation plan 
H = High emphasis in the implementation plan 
Table HI. Relative Importance of ES Implementation Factors 
(From Bradley and Häuser, 1995) 
Importance values of high, medium, and low were determined for the factors 
within each category of ES by analyzing the characteristics of each ES and by applying 
information from existing implementation literature (Bradley and Häuser, 1995).  The key 
to this framework is not in the methods that were used to develop it but in the analytical 
tools it provides for developing an implementation plan. 
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As an example of how this process might work, consider developing an 
implementation plan for a category II expert system. At a minimum, the plan should focus 
on those factors which are rated as being highly influential. Based on Table III, those 
factors include the user's perceptions of computing technology, user involvement in the 
ES design and implementation, supervisor support, and the user's perception of change. 
Referring to Figure 2-2, MAES would be considered a category II expert system 
because it captures detailed or "deep" knowledge from a domain expert but can be 
deployed on a standalone computer. Category II expert systems are described as 
knowledge intensive systems. (Meyer and Curley, 1991) The implementation factors for 
a category II expert system, shown in Table HI, should be considered when developing the 
MAES implementation plan. 
The implementation factors offered throughout the implementation literature as 
being critical to successful implementation generally parallel those factors described above 
(Ginzberg, 1981; Tyran and George, 1993; Markus and Keil, 1994). A few of these 
factors are described below. 
Based on a study of 45 different ES projects, Tyran and George (1993) found that 
the five implementation factors with the most perceived importance were assessment of 
user needs, commitment of the human expert, ease of ES use, commitment of the user, 
and top management support. These five factors closely resemble the implementation 
factors outlined by Bradley and Häuser (1995). 
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Historically, management support and user involvement have been identified as 
common success factors in MIS implementation projects. (Ginzberg, 1981) In an attempt 
to further refine generic implementation issues, Ginzberg (1981) found through statistical 
analysis three factors which were most significant in determining implementation success. 
The first factor is commitment to the project, which involves doing everything 
necessary to ensure that the problem is understood and that the system developed solves 
the problem. The next factor is commitment to change, which entails the willingness of 
those involved to make the changes that are necessary for the system to work. The last 
critical factor is the extent of project definition and planning, which concerns the detailed 
analysis of issues such as organizational needs, project impacts, training requirements, and 
role identification. (Ginzberg, 1981) 
Though generic in nature these implementation issues provide another set of 
factors which should be analyzed together with previously discussed factors to isolate 
those issues deserving the most attention during the implementation process. This 
approach acts as an early warning system helping to track impending failures (Ginzberg, 
1981). We want to be able to focus implementation efforts to save resources, but 
knowing the issues helps us shift the likelihood of success in our favor by giving us 
guidelines for detecting problems which might lead to failure. 
Another factor that can influence implementation success is business system 
design. Tragically, systems that work well technically can go unused if they are not 
designed for "implementability."  Making an information system good enough, does not 
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ensure that people will use it. System users must be motivated to do what the system 
enables them to do and the system can not make it harder for them to do what they were 
motivated to do. (Markus and Keil, 1994) 
When systems are not used the temptation is to mandate use. Unfortunately, 
mandated use can lead people to use a system in ways that do not improve their 
performance. Generally, when a system's design conflicts with the users' motivations and 
incentives, managers will not force them to use the system. (Markus and Keil, 1994) For 
the purposes of MAES's implementation, the development process is too far along to 
consider building implementability into the business system design; however, some of the 
issues related to business system design, such as motivation and incentives, will be 
discussed later in the context of performance measures and rewards. 
Considering all of the factors described above, the goal for building an ES is 
organizational improvement (Markus and Keil, 1994). With MAES organizational 
improvement occurs if No-Fault Evident (NFE) repair parts are decreased or if the mean 
time to repair (MTTR) casualties is decreased. To achieve organizational improvement or 
implementation success, the system must be used. 
Three subgoals comprise the overall goal of organizational improvement. First, 
when people use the system as they are intended to, they will achieve the goal. Second, 
the system must have the functionality and user interface, so that users can easily use it to 
accomplish a goal. And, third, people must actually use the system in the intended manner 
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which means management has to measure, monitor, and reward their progress toward the 
goal. (Markus and Keil, 1994) 
E.        INTEGRATING IMPLEMENTATION FACTORS AND RISKS 
One method for simplifying the complex task of integrating implementation factors 
and risks into a successful implementation plan is to begin with a detailed scenario of what 
the ideal implementation plan would look like. From there, identify the current state and 
then target the deficient areas. (Fowler, 1996) Using the framework provided by Bradley 
and Häuser (1995) shown as Table III, we begin constructing the ideal implementation 
scenario by stating the desired outcomes from emphasizing the factors important to the 
implementation success of a type II expert system. 
In addressing implementation factors, the ideal implementation plan would: 
• Reinforce positive attitudes about computer technology and reverse negative 
attitudes about computer technology. 
• Create realistic expectations about the capabilities of MAES. 
• Involve the users in the implementation plan to the degree that they feel they 
have influence in the process. 
• Promote system usage through appropriate organizational rewards. 
• Provide a system of training that instills confidence in the users and offers the 
opportunity for additional instruction on request. 
• Build enthusiastic support at all levels of management, from the Commanding 
Officer to work center personnel. 
• Establish several consulting aids in the form of a help desk or points of contact 
of MAES advocates. 
• Condition MAES users so that they will be amenable to the changes that 
MAES will bring to their work environment. 
In addressing implementation risks, the ideal implementation plan would mitigate 
risks by: 
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• Creating feedback channels flowing from the ships, the fleet training centers, 
and the fleet technical support centers, so that as errors are discovered in the 
knowledge base, corrections can be made. 
• Obligating the maker of the expert system shell to a 3-5 year support contract 
and obligating appropriate funds for NSWC personnel to maintain and support 
MAES. 
• Providing hardware from reputable companies and supporting the hardware 
with appropriate equipage such as carrying cases and surge protectors. 
• Including basic computer training in the initial MAES familiarization training. 
• Winning FTSC technical representatives' support. 
• Dissolving resistance to change among fire controlmen. 
• Identifying and properly handling politically sensitive issues. 
• Developing ardent chain-of-command support at all levels. 
• Promoting continued excellent relations with the Fleet Training Centers. 
• Building a quality training plan that reaches all of the targeted audiences and 
then perpetuates itself so that MAES use is not jeopardized by the transient 
assignment of Navy personnel. 
The ideal implementation plan should handle the implementation factors and risks 
as described above. Factor consideration and risk mitigation, comprise two significant 
pillars of this plan. Common threads running through the risks and factors include training 
in various forms, overcoming resistance to change, building positive perceptions and 
developing pervasive support of MAES. Having created the ideal implementation plan, 
the next step is to assess the current state and then focus on the selected areas. 
F.        SUMMARY 
"An important key to the acceptance and use of expert systems in organizations 
lies in effective implementation." (Bradley and Häuser, 1995) Effective implementation 
hinges on how well the implementation plan addresses the key implementation factors and 
anticipates the "show stopping" risks. Effective implementation also depends on how well 
41 
the plan is executed.  A great plan that is too expensive or too difficult to carry out has 
minimal value. 
Based on the analysis provided in this chapter, the MAES implementation team 
should begin by focusing their efforts on the "high emphasis" factors for a Category H 
expert system as shown in Table II. The important factors include emphasis on the user's 
perceptions of computing technology, user involvement in the ES design and 
implementation, supervisor support, and user's perception of change. 
The team should also begin by addressing the Class II and Class IE risks These 
risks pose the most serious threats to MAES's success. The Class HI risks are hierarchical 
resistance, tech rep resistance, FTSC endorsement, training, chain-of-command support, 
and deployment funding. Because of the overlap between risks and factors, this process 
should be a concurrent effort rather than separate endeavors. 
A comprehensive implementation plan built on the factors and risks described 
above is not provided. Instead, the next three chapters will offer individual 
implementation plans dealing with the deployment of MAES to the ships, the integration 
of MAES into the formal training pipeline, and the transition of MAES to NSWC PHD for 
life cycle support. Each of these three plans will use the ideal implementation scenario as 
their benchmark. From there, the "current state" will be assessed which will help the 
deployment team target the deficient areas. 
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m. DEPLOYING MAES TO ALL MK 92 MOD 2 FCS SHIPS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter discusses the long-term implementation plan for deploying MAES to 
all MK 92 Mod 2 FCS ships. The core issues covered by this chapter include the 
hardware, documentation, training, and support requirements necessary to successfully 
deploy MAES. 
Before discussing the core implementation issues, two subsidiary issues are 
addressed. The first subsidiary issue concerns "lessons learned" from the initial 
deployment of the MAES prototype. Additionally, "lessons learned" from initial efforts to 
schedule the full-scale deployment of the updated MAES prototype are discussed. The 
second subsidiary issue concerns the MAES software approval process. These two 
subsidiary issues provide a background for consideration of the core issues mentioned 
above. 
B. LESSONS LEARNED FROM INITIAL DEPLOYMENT 
This section discusses the "lessons learned" both from the initial deployment of the 
MAES prototype and from the type commander scheduling process that might help shape 
the long-term implementation of MAES. Due to funding constraints, the MAES 
prototype was not implemented as planned. Thus, empirical information about full-scale 
prototype implementation is limited. Regardless, there are still "lessons learned" to 
convey that might be useful in the eventual deployment of MAES. 
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From the deployment of an early prototype version of the MAES calibration 
module aboard a COMNAVSURFPAC ship lessons were learned about how sailors may 
or may not use MAES and the laptop computer on which MAES is loaded. Sailors loaded 
their preventive maintenance system (PMS) schedules, their training plans, and their 
evaluations onto the MAES laptop. Based on this experience, one should expect that the 
uses for the laptop will expand to the laptop's capacity unless measures are taken to 
restrict use. 
Other lessons learned from the prototype were that more experienced FC's were 
reluctant to use MAES because they did not feel that they needed it and familiarity with 
MAES centered around one or two FC's. One must keep in mind, however, that this was 
an early prototype of the first module. The experienced fire control technicians had 
excellent knowledge of the troubleshooting procedures in this domain. Also, many of the 
enhancement features (such as pictures and "how" procedures) designed to encourage the 
use of MAES, were not implemented in the prototype. Both of these lessons learned fall 
into risk categories discussed in Chapter II. 
Even though full-scale prototype deployment has not occurred, prospective 
implementation dates and requests for three to six Atlantic Fleet ships were submitted to 
the Atlantic Fleet scheduling conference. Several things were learned from this process. 
First, the scheduling process must be initiated one quarter prior to the planned 
implementation quarter so that inputs are available for the applicable scheduling 
conference. 
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Second, even though inputs are submitted to the scheduling conference through 
NSWC, who sends a representative to the conference, other involved activities, such as 
the Naval Science Advisor's Program, must also be notified of the deployment team's 
intentions. The final lesson learned from the scheduling process is that ships are hard to 
catch inport. Finding three ships inport at the same time is unlikely. This point will have 
a significant bearing on how full-scale implementation efforts are conducted. 
C.       MAES SOFTWARE APPROVAL PROCESS 
The software approval process involves at least four steps. The first step involves 
obtaining ISEA approval. The second step involves obtaining NAVSEA approval. The 
third step entails establishing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between 
NAVSEA and the fleet commanders and the fourth step involves obtaining the approval of 
the type commanders to deploy MAES aboard their ships. Details of these four steps 
should be explored and negotiated after completion of the production version of MAES. 
As McGaha noted, standard Navy procedures for deploying diagnostic software to 
the fleet have not been established. (McGaha, 1994) Until a policy is established, 
developers must seek implementation authority from the type commanders. For MAES, 
the NAVSEA project manager for the MK 92 FCS must obtain written authority from the 
type commanders (step four) to deploy MAES to the ships. This written authority will be 
in the form of a message from the type commanders to all ships with MK 92 Mod 2 FCS. 
(McGaha, 1994) Recent conversations with type commanders' staff members indicate 
that these requirements are still intact. (Whitman, 1996; Simino, 1996) 
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While this approval process might be administratively burdensome it accomplishes 
several objectives. It establishes implied command support for MAES. It advertises 
MAES up and down the chain-of-command, and it provides authoritative guidance for 
ship's Commanding Officers concerning the use of MAES. 
NAVSEA's request to the type commanders should contain a recommended draft 
of the approval message that includes MAES points of contact and various reporting 
procedures. The deployment team should work closely with NAVSEA and the type 
commanders' staffs concerning the content of the approval message. If carefully drafted, 
the type commanders' approval message could give MAES a huge boost during the early 
days of implementation. 
D.       HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
Many of the issues in this section were previously examined by McGaha (1994). 
Rather than restating previous findings, this section will draw on McGaha's research to 
make recommendations pertinent to the long-term implementation of MAES. 
1.        Dedicated Laptop Versus Ship's Existing Resources 
Ship's existing computer resources can be placed into three categories - desktop 
computers, portable computers, and personally owned computers. The inventory of these 
resources varies among ships and ship classes, but as one might expect, the FFG's have 
the fewest computer resources. While installing MAES on existing shipboard computers 
might be the cheapest way to deploy MAES, this option introduces undesirable variables 
into the implementation plan. 
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Experience using MAES on various laptops and desktop computers indicates that 
different hardware and software configurations can complicate the initial loading and use 
of MAES. In one case, a desktop computer loaded with MAES would not properly 
display the program because of incorrect video drivers. In another case, one laptop and a 
desktop loaded with MAES, both running Windows® 95, would not properly display 
several MAES screens. These complications may not be easy to overcome for people 
who are unfamiliar with computers. Furthermore, variation across the wide spectrum of 
computers that might be found on ships would create a maintenance nightmare for the 
MAES configuration manager. 
Deploying MAES on a dedicated laptop computer accomplishes the following: 
• Minimizes the range of potential hardware and software compatibility problems 
which in the long-term should make the systems easier to maintain. 
• Creates the best assurance that computer resources will be available for fire 
control technicians when they need it. 
• Acts  as  a  marketing  tool  for  MAES.      This   new  "toy"   will   invite 
experimentation and use. 
Most FFG's have no more than two laptop computers on board.  (Simino, 1996). 
Given their scarcity, it is unlikely an existing laptop computer would be transferred to the 
FC's for their exclusive use. Using an existing desktop computer might be an option but 
that would limit MAES's functionality as pictures and "Hows" would not be readily 
available to technicians.  (McGaha, 1994) Additionally, as with the laptops, there are no 
guarantees that a desktop, convenient to the FC's, would be available.  This area is to be 
evaluated in more detail during the COMNAVSURFLANT evaluation. 
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An added benefit of providing the ships with a laptop computer is that a new 
computer comes with a warranty. This is especially important since there are no Navy 
operated computer repair facilities available to Atlantic Fleet ships. The east coast Shore 
Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMA) no longer provide computer repair support 
to the ships. (Simino, 1996) With the protection of a warranty, dedicated laptop 
computers provide the best hardware solution for successfully deploying MAES. 
There is no standard laptop computer designated for shipboard use; however, any 
laptop procurement strategy should include consideration of future shipboard support 
issues. (Orchard, 1996; Curtis, 1996) One approach to ensure future supportability is to 
purchase computers from contracts that are accessible by the ships. Purchasing the laptop 
computers from an existing GSA contract or one of the Navy's Indefinite Delivery 
Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts offers the most practical approach. Since the ships 
have access to these contracts, this approach ensures consistency between what the ships 
can purchase and what is purchased for the ships. 
2. Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Versus Ruggedized Computers 
This comparison weighs lower prices for COTS computers against greater 
reliability for ruggedized computers. As mentioned in Chapter II, unreliable hardware can 
pose a risk to successful implementation. Of course, increased reliability comes at a price. 
Based on information provided by the U. S. Army, ruggedized computers do not always 
provide greater reliability. (Army, 1996) 
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At today's prices, ruggedized computers are roughly three to four times as 
expensive as COTS laptop computers. Fielding MAES on ruggedized computers would 
require significantly higher upfront expenditures and would also burden ships with higher 
replacement costs than for COTS laptops. Presently, there is no funding available to 
purchase ruggedized computers for evaluation. 
One alternative to leverage the lower prices and perhaps comparable reliability of 
COTS laptops would be to initially purchase extra COTS laptops. These extra laptops 
could be used to quickly replace failed computers. This strategy might save money 
upfront as computer buys could be made incrementally based on failure rates. In addition 
to saving money, this strategy could improve the chances for implementation success by 
simplifying users' maintenance responsibilities. 
3.        Government Procurement 
In addition to the procurement options proposed by McGaha (1994), the option of 
purchasing the laptop computers using a General Services Administration (GSA) contract 
should be considered. The combination of the National Performance Review and the 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, perpetuated by the effective repeal of the 
Brooks Act, gave GSA the incentive to change many of its old restrictive policies. GSA 
prices and services are now more competitive with Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity 
(IDIQ) contracts. (GCN, 1996) 
For purchases over $2,500, GSA customers select the "best value" from three 
competitors.  GSA customers have the flexibility to negotiate prices with the vendors to 
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get the lowest available price. Maximum order limitations that might have prevented 
purchasing MAES laptops through GSA have been eliminated. Further, the requirement 
to synopsize orders over $50,000 has been abolished by GSA. (GCN, 1996) GSA 
reforms have made this procurement alternative worth investigating for the MAES 
laptops' purchase. 
4.        Accountability and Security 
Implementing the MAES laptop as a piece of MK 92 FCS test equipment offers 
the best assurances that the computer will be used for its intended purpose, that there will 
be a reduced susceptibility to viruses, and that it will be inventoried frequently. (McGaha, 
1994) Another option would be to classify the MAES laptop as controlled equipage. 
While this option would impose regular inventory guidelines and place the laptop in the 
signed custody of MK 92 FCS work center personnel it would also open up the computer 
for uses other than MAES. 
Controlled equipage designations do not imply the same type of use restrictions 
that test equipment designations do. Based on the time and expense required to develop 
MAES, restricted use of the laptop by designating it as test equipment is justified. An 
NSWC representative is currently evaluating the requirements to include the MAES laptop 
as a piece of test equipment on an allowance equipage list (AEL). (Edozie, 1996) 
5. Fielding, Maintenance, and Replacement 
McGaha (1994) suggested three alternatives for fielding computers to the ships. 
The alternatives were that NAVSEA, the type commanders, or the ships would purchase 
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or provide the laptop computers.   (McGaha, 1994)  Due to funding limitations, two of 
those options should be eliminated. Neither the type commanders nor the ships have the 
budgeted funding to procure dedicated laptops for the initial deployment of MAES. 
(Curtis, 1996)   If MAES will be deployed on laptop computers, then NAVSEA should 
fund the purchase of the computers for initial system deployment. 
Maintenance responsibilities for the computers should rest with the ships. They 
would be supported by computer warranties. As mentioned above, computer maintenance 
support from Navy activities is no longer available on the east coast (Simino, 1996) 
Computer maintenance support is available on the west coast at the Shore Intermediate 
Maintenance Activity (SIMA), San Diego, but their experience shows that replacing 
defective laptops is normally more economical than repairing them.    (Tan, 1996) 
Providing reliable hardware will be an important element in the successful 
implementation of MAES. The reliability of COTS laptop computers aboard ships is 
unknown. Based on personal experience, personal computers are much more durable in 
the harsh shipboard environment than one would expect but the hardware still represents a 
risk. Durable, hard shelled carrying cases and surge protectors would further reduce the 
risk. 
This risk can be further mitigated by providing responsive support to MAES users 
who encounter problems with their computers. One alternative is that the system 
configuration manager at NSWC could be responsible for replacing defective computers 
during the first year of MAES's deployment.    Damaged computers would be the 
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responsibility of the ships to repair or replace.  Computers infected by viruses would also 
be the responsibility of the ships to repair or replace. 
E.       DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS 
The MAES implementation package should include a MAES user's manual (see 
Cepek, 1996), user's manuals for all prebundled software such as Microsoft DOS® and 
Microsoft Windows®, and user's manuals for the hardware. In addition to preloading the 
MAES software, two copies of the MAES software diskettes should be provided. One 
copy should remain in the work center and the other copy should be turned over to the 
ship's ADP security officer. 
Elements of the MAES maintenance manual described by McGaha including the 
knowledge diagnostic trees; procedure diagrams; and testing, validation and verification 
forms are not necessary to support MAES at the shipboard level.    (McGaha, 1994) 
Transfer of these items to the software life cycle manager will be discussed in Chapter V. 
F.        TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 
The nucleus of MAES training contains three major elements: the trainers, the 
methods and media used to deliver training, and the students. This section discusses each 
of these elements. 
1.        The Trainers 
NSWC PHD, the Fleet Training Centers (FTC), and the Fleet Technical Support 
Centers (FTSC) represent the spectrum of MAES trainers. After the full-scale 
deployment of MAES, NSWC will probably not be involved in further training efforts. 
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On-going training for MAES will be conducted by the FTC's but this training differs from 
implementation training. With NSWC at one end of the spectrum and the FTCs at the 
other, FTSC's involvement falls somewhere between these two ends. FTSC involvement 
could provide an important connecting bond between the initial implementation training 
provided by NSWC and the on-going classroom training provided by the FTC's. 
As mentioned in Chapter II, deployment training is susceptible to several risks. 
Sailors who transfer from a command without MAES may not receive adequate training. 
At the same time, those sailors who receive the training may transfer causing MAES 
knowledge to lapse. Developers of shipboard information systems have found that 
personnel turnover can leave a ship with no corporate knowledge of a system and no 
traceability for what has happened with the system. (Williams, 1996; Pandit; 1996) From 
personal experience aboard one of the first ships equipped with Shipboard Non-tactical 
Automated Program II (SNAP II), this risk seems largely ignored by some implementation 
teams. 
FTSC representatives' participation in on-going shipboard MAES training could 
mitigate this risk by perpetuating implementation training. FTSC representatives are in a 
perfect position to become the guardians of shipboard MAES corporate knowledge. Their 
expertise combined with their frequent visits to most of the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS ships place 
them in a position to monitor MAES usage and training with minimal effort. 
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2.        Methods and Media Used to Deliver Training 
Several methods and media are available to disseminate MAES training.   The 
various methods and media are listed below from the most preferred to the least preferred: 
• On-site training by a deployment team from NSWC. 
• On-site training by FTSC representatives. 
• Training by a deployment team at a central site such as the FTC's. 
Training at a central site using video-teleconferencing capabilities. 
Videotaped training with videotapes mailed to the ships. 
Written training mailed to the ships with the program. 
The optimal training plan would include on-site training at each of the ships. This 
training could be conducted by NSWC or FTSC representatives. If performed by NSWC 
representatives, this could be the most expensive and time consuming training method. As 
pierside residents, the FTSC representatives could save money in terms of travel expenses 
if they implement the software and perform the training during "windows of opportunity" 
created by routine technical assist visits. 
Another approach would be to train several ships at once at a central site such as a 
fleet training center. This method has advantages in that it saves time and travel money 
and may offer the fewest distractions for the students. A variation of this training method 
would be to conduct the training at a central site in each homeport using video- 
teleconferencing capabilities. One of the disadvantages to this method might be the one- 
hour time restriction normally imposed on video teleconferences. 
Under strict funding and time constraints, videotaped training should be 
considered.   While not the optimal method, videotaped training offers the deployment 
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team the opportunity to carefully structure the presentation's content and delivery. As a 
last resort, a written MAES training guide based on the user's manual could be included in 
the MAES implementation package. 
The training plan for full-scale MAES implementation should be tailored based on 
the findings from the prototype deployment. It may be discovered that a combination of 
the above methods offers the best chance for successful implementation training. For 
specific information about the prototype deployment training plan refer to Cepek (1996). 
3.        The Students 
The population of potential MAES students includes everyone from Commanding 
Officers to software maintenance engineers. Of course, the most important students are 
the shipboard FC's. The deployment team must be prepared to train all the potential 
MAES students. 
The trainers will be the first students. This means that new members of the 
deployment team must train themselves with regards to MAES before they can train 
others. For tips about the most effective training techniques for introducing MAES, the 
trainers should contact the FTC instructors who have experience with MAES. They 
should also refer to the lessons learned from the prototype deployment training. 
G.       SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES 
This section describes the support requirements and procedures that should be 
addressed during MAES implementation training. Areas of concern include hardware 
support, software support and various reporting procedures. 
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1.        Hardware Support 
To minimize hardware risks, the MAES configuration manager at NSWC PHD 
should fully checkout all deployable laptops prior to issue. Even though they will be 
covered by warranties, defective laptops pose a risk to successful implementation because 
unreliable hardware can prejudice users against MAES. A complementary alternative to 
minimize hardware risk would be for NSWC PHD to replace problem hardware and 
assume responsibility for pursuing warranty work during the initial implementation phase. 
As a part of this plan, replacement computers could be staged at the FTSC's or at the 
ships' squadron offices. 
2. Software Support 
Software support issues fall into two categories, prebundled software and MAES 
software. Within this context, software support can be further divided into immediate 
"help" related support and non-urgent support, Prebundled software includes software 
such as Microsoft Windows® that may be pre-loaded on the laptop computer. Support 
for prebundled software should be pursued by the ships through the applicable software 
company. The MAES configuration manager should stay current on prebundled software 
issues and provide timely guidance to the users. 
Support for MAES software should be provided by the MAES configuration 
manager and the MAES software engineer. This support should be available by telephone, 
Naval message, or SALTS message. Current addresses and points of contact should be 
either in the user's manual or in an addendum to the user's manual. 
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3.        Reporting and Updating Procedures 
Beyond "help" related questions, issues arise related to reporting errors, submitting 
trouble reports, and recommending changes that are serious but not urgent. Existing 
reports such as the NSWC PHD Software Trouble Report, the Digital Systems Feedback 
Report (NSWSES-3142/1), and the Engineering Change Proposal (DD 1692) provide a 
solid foundation for addressing these issues. 
The Software Trouble Report (STR) provides a communications channel for 
reporting problems in the software or for proposing enhancements to the software. It is 
used mainly by engineers, such as the In-Service Engineering Agent (ISEA), Software 
Support Agent, Design Agent, System Integration Agent, Technical Direction Agent, and 
the Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) agent, who are familiar with the 
software and the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS. The STR is the medium by which 
problems/enhancements are entered into the Configuration Control System (PC-CCS). 
PC-CCS is a database used to document and track configuration related data. (Gorham, 
1996) 
Designed for use by sailors and support personnel, the Digital Systems Feedback 
Report (DSFR) serves the same function as the STR, but uses a simpler format. When a 
DSFR is received by the ISEA (NSWC PHD for MAES), the problem is validated through 
a preliminary investigation, and if valid, the DSFR is rewritten as an STR for submission 
to PC-CCS. (Gorham, 1996) 
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Periodically, open STRs are segregated into functionally related groups and 
Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) are written. ECPs describe each problem in the 
group, the design of the proposed solution, the interactions between the fixes, and the 
impacts on other hardware, software, or documentation. (Gorham, 1996b) The software 
update process might proceed as follows (Gorham, 1996b): 
• DSFRs are submitted by users, validated, and rewritten as STRs by the 
ISEA/SSA. Designers, ISEA/SSA, users, and other involved agencies also 
submit STRs. 
• The Configuration Manager (CM) enters the STRs into the PC-CCS database. 
• STRs are periodically reviewed by the Software Configuration Management 
Board (SCCB) and assigned a priority, category, and status. Priorities range 
from high to low. Categories are assigned codes of S (software 
implementation error, no impact on requirements documentation), E (design 
error, affects code and requirements specifications), or D (affects requirements 
documents only) depending on the type of error and its affect on requirements 
documentation. Status can be indicated by a variety of codes meaning open, 
under investigation, closed, etc. 
• After approval by the SCCB, certain ECPs are selected for a software build 
referred to as a version release. A test/project plan is written and an estimate is 
provided. 
• When funded, the designs in the ECPs are coded and tested. Using PC-CCS, 
the CM documents and tracks implementation of these corrections. 
• When fully and successfully tested, the software version is delivered to the 
Fleet. 
The DSFR provides fire controlmen with a simple form that they can use for a 
variety of purposes. Whether reporting software errors, submitting trouble reports, or 
recommending enhancements, sailors can use the DSFR as their link to the software 
configuration managers. The User's Manual includes a copy of a DSFR. The 
communications channels required to support the DSFR reporting process will be 
discussed in Chapter V. 
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H.       SUMMARY - THE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
The hardware, documentation, training, and support issues discussed in this 
chapter will be influenced by the experiences gained from the M-scale deployment of the 
MAES prototype. While the various alliances and agreements needed to ensure successful 
long-term implementation can not be solidified yet, the deployment team should begin to 
identify and pursue the relationships, activities, and policies important to a successful 
implementation. 
The MAES long-term implementation plan is included as Appendix B. The 
framework for this plan was adapted from the Fleet Material Support Office's (FMSO) 
Implementation Planning Guide. (Moran, 1996; FMSO, 1994) The reader should 
understand that this implementation plan is subject to change based on "lessons learned" 
from the MAES prototype deployment. This implementation plan should be viewed as a 
working document rather than as a definitive implementation guide. 
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IV. INTEGRATION OF MAES INTO THE MK 92 MOD 2 FCS 
"C" SCHOOL CURRICULUM 
A. OVERVIEW 
MAES was introduced to the first group of MK 92 Mod 2 FCS students in 
January 1996. Through the cooperation and support of FTC San Diego, laboratory 
experiments were conducted with these students which provided the first empirical 
evidence that MAES performs as promised. These test results are summarized in 
Appendix A. 
The Fleet Combat Training Center (FCTC), Dam Neck, the east coast equivalent 
of FTC San Diego, received MAES software and a familiarization presentation in June 
1996. At this writing, FCTC instructors are just beginning to learn how to use MAES 
and to appreciate the power of this program. 
While MAES has not been formally integrated into the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS 
curriculum, FTC San Diego's experiences with the program over the past two years 
provides valuable insight into the integration process. The guidance received from FTC 
San Diego will serve as the basis for the MAES integration plan. 
B. DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS 
Though the training centers will not perform life cycle maintenance functions on 
the MAES software, system knowledge diagrams that were developed by the domain 
expert should be provided to them. This will allow the training centers to analyze the 
knowledge diagrams if the need or desire arises. Additional documentation, such as a 
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user's manual, complete with information about obtaining and loading upgrades, 
submitting a change proposal or error report, and receiving help, should also be provided 
to the training centers. Sometimes forgotten, the training centers should receive all 
follow-on documentation that is distributed to the ships so that they can keep their MAES 
training current with fleet developments. 
Manufacturers' user's manuals for the hardware, including warranty information, 
and users' manuals for the supporting software, such as Microsoft Windows® and 
Microsoft DOS® 6.2, should be provided to the training centers. Documentation 
pertaining to the expert system shell should not be required by the schools as they will not 
have the development system. 
C.        HARDWARE/SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS 
Both of the training centers have been provided with at least one laptop computer 
for dedicated MAES use. Concurrent with the deployment of MAES to the ships, each 
training center should receive a software and hardware package identical to the versions 
sent to the ships. Ideally, each training center should receive three laptop computers. 
Two of the laptops would be used in the laboratory and the other one would be connected 
to a personal computer compatible overhead projector for use in the classroom. 
Procedures should be in place to ensure that the training centers are on the distribution list 
for future software updates. 
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D.       IMPACT ON THE CURRICULUM 
Introducing new material into a course usually involves modifications to various 
training materials ranging from the formal training plan to instructor guides. Even a simple 
change to a curriculum can result in hours of administrative work to ensure that all 
affected parts of the curriculum have been changed. 
MAES's integration into the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS curriculum will not require 
extensive changes to the course documentation since the curriculum is currently under 
review. (Heidenreich, 1995) Any changes initiated by the introduction of MAES can be 
written into the new course rather than treated as a modification to the old course. 
Experience has shown that classroom training does not need to change to 
accommodate MAES. By learning about MAES after the Daily Systems Operability Test 
(DSOT) module, students do not need additional classroom training to understand MAES. 
A simple demonstration in the lab on how to use MAES for fault isolation is all that 
students need to get started. Hands-on experience is the best way to learn how to use 
MAES. (Myers, 1996) 
Based on FTC San Diego's work, the only changes to the course may be in a 
couple of the lab assignments.    Modifications to the allotted course hours will not be 
required to support MAES training. 
E.        COURSE MATERIALS REQUIREMENTS 
Existing course materials that provide fault isolation scenarios for laboratory 
troubleshooting practice will  support the inclusion of MAES  into  the laboratory 
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assignments. Given a laptop computer loaded with MAES, the training centers should not 
require any additional course materials. 
F.        SUMMARY - INTEGRATION PLAN 
The integration of MAES into the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS curriculum will not require 
the same extensive implementation effort necessary for fielding MAES to the ships. By 
the time the production version of MAES reaches the ships FCTC Dam Neck will have 
worked with MAES for almost a year and FTC San Diego will have over two years 
experience with MAES. This simplifies the integration process and allows the deployment 
team to narrowly target long-term support related issues rather than familiarization issues. 
A plan for integrating MAES into the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS curriculum is provided 
as Appendix C. 
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V. TRANSniONING LIFE CYCLE SUPPORT FOR MAES TO 
NSWC PHD 
A.       OVERVIEW 
This chapter discusses the activities and supporting documentation required to 
transition life cycle support for MAES to NSWC PHD. This process, while completing 
the Naval Postgraduate School's involvement in MAES, establishes the foundation for the 
future of MAES. The quality of the documentation passed to NSWC will be a key 
determinant in the maintainability of MAES. This will impact the long-term success of the 
system. 
As was done with the shipboard MAES implementation plan and the fleet training 
centers' MAES integration plan, risk mitigation will be considered in the MAES transfer 
plan. Maintainability and documentation are just two of the risks that the MAES 
deployment team must consider when transferring this system. Other risks include attitude 
towards change, supportability, and training. 
This section begins with a discussion of the documentation needed for NSWC 
PHD to maintain MAES. Next, training requirements are described.   An analysis of the 
communications channels required to maintain MAES follows.   The chapter concludes 
with a description of annual support costs. 
B.       DOCUMENTATION REQIHREMENTS 
The documentation package for MAES will be based on the guidelines provided by 
military standard 498 (MIL-STD-498), Software Development and Documentation. 
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These guidelines will be tailored as necessary to accommodate the visual programming 
environment which was used to develop MAES. Elements of the documentation package 
will include a system level description, a software design document, the MAES user's 
manual, and a version description document. (Lester, 1996) 
The system level description will provide an overview of the system's purpose, the 
system development environment, the target operational environment, and the system 
architecture. Providing greater detail than the system level description, the software 
design document will focus on the system architecture, the methods used to generate 
problem analysis trees, and descriptions of the problem analysis diagnostic trees. 
The MAES user's manual will öfter users information on how to install, initialize, 
and operate MAES. Procedures for getting help, reporting problems, or recommending 
changes will also be provided as an addendum to the user's manual. 
The version description document will list the version of tools used to develop 
MAES, version numbers of MAES modules, versions of commercial software which are 
compatible with this release of MAES, any known problems with this release of MAES, 
operator work-arounds for any known problems, and points of contact for MAES. 
The system level description of MAES is included as Appendix D and the user's 
manual is provided by Cepek's Master's Thesis. (Cepek, 1996) The software design 
document and the version description document are being developed for the calibration 
and performance modules of MAES by the respective contractors and the NSWC project 
engineer. 
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C.        TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 
Training requirements must be considered for both the MAES configuration 
manager and the MAES software engineers. As an active participant in the development 
of MAES, the configuration manager at NSWC PHD has experience with the 
development tool (Adept), prototype versions of MAES, and the knowledge 
documentation. Additional training for the configuration manager should not be required. 
Written using a visual programming language, MAES will likely pose a new 
challenge to software engineers at NSWC who have minimal experience with such a tool. 
Transferring MAES to the NSWC software engineers will bring change to their work 
environment because MAES was developed with SoftSell Adept. A visual programming 
language, Adept is somewhat different from the languages normally used by NSWC 
software engineers. (Smith, 1994) Their attitudes towards this change pose significant 
potential risks to the successful transfer of MAES. Formal Adept training, discussed 
below, may offer the best opportunity to positively influence their attitudes. 
Even for seasoned software engineers, training represents a serious risk when 
introducing a new tool. To mitigate the training risk and to ensure the successful transfer 
of MAES, NSWC software engineers should, like other MAES users, receive training but 
of a more specialized nature. 
Formal Adept training should be provided to at least one of the software engineers 
who will maintain MAES. (Gorham, 1996a) This will minimize the learning curve for this 
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tool and hopefully decrease the time it takes to perform maintenance on MAES.  It will 
also provide key points of contact with SoftSell should questions arise. 
D.       MAINTAINING MAES 
MAES maintenance is a broad based function involving the efforts of personnel 
from NSWC, the FTSC's, the training centers, and the ships. Communication is the key 
to a successful maintenance program. Communication channels must be established to 
facilitate feedback from the ships, to encourage critical review and input from the ships, 
the FTSC's and the training centers, and to coordinate the ongoing improvement of 
MAES through updates by NSWC. 
As discussed in Chapter II, many of the serious risks threatening the success of 
MAES can be mitigated by developing effective communications. The long-term success 
of the MAES maintenance program will depend on active and open communications 
among all involved activities.   The communication channels needed to support MAES 
include feedback channels, configuration management channels, and update channels. 
1.        Feedback Channels 
Before the transfer of MAES to NSWC, responsive feedback channels must be in 
place to support maintenance efforts and to assist MAES users. These communication 
channels must support activities such as error reporting, recommending changes, placing 
trouble calls, and requesting help. 
Rather than creating new MAES specific procedures and reports, existing 
feedback mechanisms should be adapted as necessary to support MAES.  This minimizes 
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the number of different reporting channels which essentially accomplish similar tasks. 
Standard reporting procedures for different systems simplifies the process for the sailors. 
(Curtis, 1996) 
Existing reports such as the NSWC PHD Software Trouble Report (SFR), the 
Digital Systems Feedback Report (DSFR) (NSWSES-3142/1), and the Engineering 
Change Proposal (ECP), DD Form 1692, provide mechanisms for reporting trouble, 
getting help, and recommending changes. Discussed in Chapter m, these forms are 
included as Appendix E. The MAES User's Manual includes a copy of a DSFR. ECPs 
and STRs are forms routinely used by MK 92 FCS engineers and should not require 
additional distribution to support MAES feedback. 
While these feedback channels can be used by the ships, the FTSC's, or the 
training centers, they are primarily designed to support the ships. Other channels are 
required to support long-term configuration management issues which are best handled by 
the technical experts. 
2.        Configuration Management Channels 
The objective of configuration management channels should be to link the 
technical experts together in a cooperative effort. This can be accomplished informally by 
promoting e-mail correspondence between the technical experts and formally by including 
MAES as a new program covered by the existing MK 92 Software Configuration Control 
Board (SCCB). (Gorham, 1996b) 
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Membership on the board might initially include NPS as the Design Agent, NSWC 
PHD 4C45 as ISEA and Software Support Agent, NSWC PHD 4C46 as System 
Integration Agent, and NAVSEA 91W3PT, the MK 92 Software Program Manager, as 
the Chair. (Gorham, 1996b) Proposed membership on the board does not include 
representatives from the FTSC's, the training centers, or the type commanders who are 
valuable sources of feedback concerning MAES. Their inputs would be channeled to the 
board through reports such as STRs or through other correspondence with the ISEA. 
The board's main objective would be to provide long-range direction and planning 
for MAES software. In negotiating the details of the Software Transition Plan, the 
composition of the SCCB should be considered as well as the possibility of establishing a 
separate configuration control board to support MAES. The MK 92 Software Program 
Manager should determine the configuration control board's composition based on 
recommendations from the MAES configuration manager at NSWC PHD. 
3.        Update Channels 
As updates are formalized based on inputs received through the feedback and 
configuration management channels, the task of making and distributing the updates 
arises. The SCCB will ultimately have responsibility for deciding the extent of the changes 
to MAES and how frequently updates will be sent. Everything will be contingent on 
adequate funding. Generally, updates should be provided once a year unless a major 
change to the system occurs that warrants more frequent updates. (Gorham, 1996) Once 
the changes have been made, the next task is distributing the updates. 
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Mail has been the traditional method used to send updates to the ships. (Gorham, 
1996) The Streamlined Automated Logistics Transmission System (SALTS) 
offers a cheaper, faster, more efficient way to distribute updates to the ships.   Through 
telephone lines inport and satellite links underway, all ships have SALTS capabilities. 
SALTS provides users with a range of services from transmitting messages or 
passing e-mail to sending or receiving digital files. By posting MAES updates to the 
SALTS bulletin board, NSWC could save time and money while making the latest version 
of MAES immediately available for ships to download at their convenience. 
To use SALTS, NSWC PHD would need to purchase the SALTS software, which 
costs about $1000, and install it on a computer with a modem access. NSWC PHD would 
receive their own SALTS address which could be used to communicate with the ships and 
about 2000 other government activities throughout the world. Since NSWC has about 20 
existing SALTS locations, NSWC PHD may be able to share SALTS with an existing 
NSWC site. (Friedrichs, 1996) SALTS could prove to be an important link in the MAES 
communication network if the NSWC MAES configuration manager and software 
engineer elect to exploit this capability. 
E.       ANNUAL SUPPORT COSTS 
Annual support costs cover activities such as system configuration management 
and software configuration management. Hidden in the annual support costs are elements 
of risk. Risks such as knowledge accuracy, maintainability, documentation, and 
supportability will all impact annual support costs. 
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Qualitatively, the consequences from the occurrence of these events can be rated 
from minor to moderate threats requiring some management involvement. Quantitatively, 
the costs from the occurrence of these events can only be guessed. How much more will 
annual support costs be if the software is difficult to update or some of the knowledge is 
inaccurate? A range of annual support costs, as shown in Table IV, may provide the best 
answer. 
Position Man-years Hours 
Hourly 
Rate Subtotal Total 
Sys Config Mgr .25 440 $55 $24,200 QtrYr Option 
S/WConfigMgr .25 440 $55 $24,200 $48,400 
Sys Config Mgr .5 880 $55 $48,400 Half Yr Opt 
S/W Config Mgr .5 880 $55 $48,400 $96,800 
Sys Config Mgr 1 1759 $55 $96,745 Full Yr Opt 
S/W Config Mgr 1 1759 $55 $96,745 $193,490 
Table IV. Range of Annual Support Costs 
The hourly rate shown in Table IV is based on NSWC's stabilization rate for fiscal 
year 1996. The hours allotted per man-year were based on a 1759 hour federal work year. 
(Gassman, 1996) The stabilization rate includes: salary, station overhead, leave, holidays, 
retirement, and other fringe benefits. 
Table IV illustrates that the range of annual support costs spans from about 
$48,400 to almost $193,500. Cost estimates in this range should be used with caution 
because they probably understate the actual salary costs. The understatement results from 
vacation time and other compensatory time-off that might extend the timeframe but not 
the number of hours expended to maintain MAES. 
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As an example, assume that MAES takes one quarter man-year to maintain. Also 
assume that the system configuration manager has six weeks of vacation time. If his 
vacation days are evenly distributed across four quarters then he will take about eight days 
off during each quarter. This means that his actual time spent on maintenance might be 
440 hours but his actual time expended will be closer to 500 hours which will add another 
$3,300 to annual support costs. 
Other costs such as the administrative expenses of distributing updated software 
might also be considered, but they will likely add little to the total expenses in comparison 
to salary expenses. Depending on the involvement of FTSCLANT and FTSCPAC 
representatives, their efforts might also be included in annual support cost estimates if 
significant time is required of them. 
F.        SUMMARY - SOFTWARE TRANSITION PLAN 
As defined in MIL-STD-498, "the Software Transition Plan (STrP) identifies the 
hardware, software, and other resources needed for life cycle support of deliverable 
software and describes the developer's plans for transitioning deliverable items to the 
support agency." (MEL-STD-498, 1994) The deliverable items include documents such as 
the system level description, the software design document, the MAES user's manual and 
the version control document. 
The formal STrP includes major sections from all of these documents. It can also 
incorporate information about annual support costs and recommendations for establishing 
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communication channels, discussed above.   An STrP template (Data Item Description), 
DD Form 1664, taken from MIL-STD-498 is provided in Appendix F. 
The major burden of providing adequate MAES documentation rests with the 
NSWC project manager, NPS staff, and the civilian software engineers who developed 
the calibration and performance modules of MAES. NSWC shares responsibility with 
NPS for building the communications infrastructure that will ensure the successful long- 
term support and maintenance of MAES. 
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VL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A.       OVERVIEW 
The implementation and deployment issues related to fielding MAES are divided 
into three separate but related areas. This three-tiered implementation plan includes 
MAES's deployment to the fleet, integration into the formal training pipeline, and 
transition of life cycle support to NSWC PHD. Within this framework, the research 
questions are examined as they relate to hardware, documentation, training, and support 
requirements. Important implementation factors and risks are incorporated into the 
answer for each of the research questions. This chapter provides a summary of the 
implementation factors, risks, and other issues important to a successful fielding of 
MAES. 
B.        SUMMARY 
This thesis answers three primary research questions which are analyzed according 
to hardware, documentation, training, and support requirements. This section summarizes 
the results of research aimed at responding to these questions. Restated from Chapter I, 
the primary research questions are considered below. 
1. What are the implementation issues for deploying the MK 92 Mod 2 
FCS MAES to all MK 92 Mod 2 ships? 
The implementation issues for deploying MAES to the ships include topics such as 
approval of the production version software, selection of hardware, accummulation of 
appropriate documentation, development of a training plan, and establishment of support 
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procedures. Associated with these issues are risks and implementation factors specifically 
related to implementing expert systems such as MAES. 
Implementation factors such as user's perception of computing technology, user 
involvement in expert system implementation, supervisor support, and user perception of 
change, have all been identified as being highly important implementation factors for 
expert systems similar to MAES. Along with these implementation factors, project risks 
such as computer literacy, various levels of resistance, chain-of-command support, and 
successful deployment training should be incorporated in planning for MAES's full-scale 
deployment. Appendix B provides simple guidelines for the deployment team to follow 
with regards to these implementation factors and risks. 
One tasking for the MAES deployment team will be to get the production version 
of the MAES software approved for distribution to the fleet. The approval process will 
involve coordination between NAVSEA, the ISEA, the fleet commanders, and the type 
commanders. 
Next, the deployment team must consider fielding issues related to hardware 
selection, documentation, training, and support. Given adequate deployment funding, 
MAES should be deployed on COTS laptop computers provided to the ships with the 
hardware and prebundled software manufacturers' user's manuals. Appendix G provides 
a summary of the hardware, software, and documentation requirements needed to field 
MAES. 
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The ideal implementation training scenario would have the deployment team from 
NSWC PHD providing on-site training for each of the ships. Alternatives exist, such as 
video teleconferencing, if on-site training is too expensive or impractical. The MAES 
support plan, which establishes procedures for obtaining software and hardware support, 
should be in place prior to fielding the system. 
2. What are the requirements for integrating the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS 
MAES into the MK 92 Mod 2 "C" School curriculum at Fleet Training Center 
(FTC), San Diego and Fleet Combat Training Center (FCTC), Dam Neck? 
The long relationship between the software developers at NPS and the fleet 
training centers, especially FTC, San Diego, simplifies the process for integrating MK 92 
Mod 2 FCS MAES into the MK 92 Mod 2 "C" School curriculum. Because of the 
training centers' prior experience with MAES, familiarization training should not be 
required. Instead, the implementation process should focus on post-implementation 
support issues which are important to the long-term viability of MAES. 
As with deploying MAES to the fleet, implementation factors and risks should be 
considered when integrating MAES into the "C" school curriculum. Implementation 
factors such as user's perception of computing technology, user involvement in expert 
system implementation, supervisor support, and user perception of change, have all been 
identified as being highly important implementation factors for expert systems similar to 
MAES. Along with these implementation factors, project risks such as training center 
acceptance and advocacy, chain-of-command support, and deployment training should be 
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given careful consideration.   Appendix C provides simple guidelines for the deployment 
team to follow with regards to these implementation factors and risks. 
The integration of MAES into the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS curriculum will not require 
the same extensive effort necessary for fielding MAES to the ships. Major changes to the 
curriculum are not expected as a result of including MAES training. Hardware, software, 
and documentation requirements for the training centers will parallel the fleet requirements 
with two minor exceptions. If funds permit, the training centers should be provided with a 
laptop and a compatible overhead projector for use in the classroom. Since the training 
environment encourages understanding the system, the training centers should also receive 
the MAES domain expert's knowledge documentation. 
Initial implementation success at the training centers should be easy; however, the 
long-term success of MAES at the training centers will hinge on the life cycle manager's 
dedication to keeping the training centers current with fleet developments. 
3.        What are the requirements for transitioning life cycle support for the 
MK 92 Mod 2 FCS MAES software to NSWC PHD? 
Maintainability,   documentation,  and training  are the key  issues  related  to 
transitioning life cycle support for MAES software to NSWC PHD.   The quality of the 
documentation passed to NSWC will be important to the long-term maintainability of 
MAES software.    Adequate training will also be important, as the NSWC software 
engineers have limited experience using visual programming tools such as SoftSell Adept. 
Formal training from SoftSell will likely be necessary. 
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The documentation required to support MAES should include a system level 
description, a software design document, the MAES user's manual, and a version 
description document. In addition, all of the domain expert's knowledge documentation 
should be transferred to the NSWC software engineers. 
Long-term MAES maintenance will require establishment of communications 
channels for feedback, configuration management, and updates distribution. Existing 
reports such as the NSWC PHD Software Trouble Report (STR), the Digital Systems 
Feedback Report (DSFR), and the Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) can be adapted to 
accommodate MAES feedback requirements. The DSFR will be the most useful feedback 
mechanism for the ships. 
Based on the information received through the feedback channels, a configuration 
control board should periodically review recommended changes to MAES. Composition 
of a configuration control board for MAES should be discussed between the ISEA and 
NAVSEA. Ultimately, MAES updates should be distributed to the ships using the most 
economical and efficient method available. The Streamlined Automated Logistics 
Transmission System (SALTS) may satisfy this requirement. 
As with the deployment of MAES to the ships and the training centers, 
implementation factors and risks should be considered in transitioning life cycle support 
for MAES to NSWC PHD. The risks pertinent to MAES's transition include 
maintainability, documentation, supportability, training, and attitudes towards change. 
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B.       CONCLUSIONS 
Almost five years after the idea for the Maintenance Advisor Expert System was 
born, the system has still not been deployed to the fleet. The fact is, MAES may never 
reach the fleet. Despite its many benefits, such as improved fault isolation capabilities, 
reduced reliance on outside technical assistance, and decreased replacement of perfectly 
good repair parts, MAES may not receive deployment funding because of the class of 
ships that it supports. The Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates are severely challenged by 
decreased funding levels and reduced maintenance support. 
After deployment funding, resistance from competing experts poses the most 
significant risk to MAES. If identified and addressed early, even serious risks, like 
experts' resistance, can be controlled. 
Consideration of implementation issues and factors from a risk management 
perspective offers the best opportunity for implementation success when deploying 
technological innovations such as MAES. The risk management process should begin the 
first day of the project and continue throughout the innovation's useful life. 
In this author's opinion, obtaining funding and support for technological 
innovations in today's budgetary environment requires more than good technology and 
effective marketing. It also requires picking the right platform. If MAES receives 
deployment funding, the implementation and deployment issues discussed in this thesis 
provide a good foundation for a successful implementation plan. 
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APPENDIX A: FTC LAB EXPERIMENTS WITH MAES 
A.       OVERVIEW 
This appendix shows the results of two laboratory experiments, using MAES, 
conducted at the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS "C" school in San Diego. The original cost/benefit 
study of MAES performed in 1993 promised reduced mean-time-to-repair, lower no-fault 
evident rates, reduced reliance on external technical assistance, and improved shipboard 
training and knowledge as a result of developing and deploying MAES. (Powell, 1993) 
Until these two experiments were conducted only anecdotal incidents with the prototype 
system provided support for these benefits. 
The first experiment involved separating students who were in their final weeks of 
training into two groups. One group would use traditional troubleshooting methods and 
the other group would rely on MAES for troubleshooting assistance. Though not 
scientific, the experiment was structured to reveal the power of MAES as a fault isolation 
tool. 
The second experiment attempted to show the power of MAES by evaluating the 
troubleshooting performance of students who had little or no knowledge of the MK 92 
Mod 2 FCS. For this test, new students, with only "A" school training, were taken from 
the Phalanx Close-in Weapons Systems class. 
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B.        THE FIRST EXPERIMENT 
1.        Experiment Set-up 
The class was first separated into two groups. Each group was further divided 
into teams composed of two or three members. In the first group, students used 
traditional manual troubleshooting methods to isolate the test faults. In the second group, 
students used MAES to isolate test faults. In each set of tests, both groups were given the 
same fault to isolate and repair. Three faults were selected that fell into three separate 
categories. The faults and the fault categories are described below: 
Faults: 
Fault #1: All CAS NoGo's; open pin on rigid coax W28 at end 
connecting output BANDPASS FILTER FL3. 
Fault #2: CAS Track Target NoGo's; Ground TP15 of UD412/A1A4- 
Al 3 to inhibit CAS Track Target Gate. 
Fault #3: All CAS NoGo's except ECM; Fault UD412/A1A4-A1 
(Coho Assy) by removing +15VDC at A1-FL1. 
Fault Categories: 
Category 1    Problems everyone could be expected to solve. 
Category 2   Problems about 50% of the class could solve. 
Category 3    Problems that only a few or no one could solve. 
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2.        Experiment Results 
The experiment results are displayed in Tables A-l, A-2, and A-3 shown below: 





1. Traditional 1 3 9 and 10 30 minutes 0 
1. Traditional 1 3 1 and 6 28 minutes 0 
1. Traditional 1 3 4 and 7 10 minutes 0 
1. MAES Team 1 3 3,5and8 4 minutes 0 
Table A-l. Fault 3/Category 1 Results 
As illustrated in Table A-l, the students who used MAES isolated the fault faster 
than any of the traditional troubleshooting teams. With regards to the MAES team, the 
instructor commented that this was the "easiest lab ever." MAES picked the fault strictly 
from the calibration results requiring no additional troubleshooting steps. This was a 
category one problem which meant that everyone in the class was expected to successfully 
isolate this fault. 
2. Traditional 2 1 3,5 and 8 62 minutes 1 
2. MAES Team 2 1 land7 62 minutes 0 
2. MAES Team 2 1 9 and 10 40 minutes 0 
Table A-2. Fault 1/Category 2 Results 
Table A-2 shows the results from the category two fault isolation efforts. The 
most significant data shown in this table is that the traditional team pulled a No-Fault 
Evident (NFE) repair part which was valued at about $4,000. Neither of the MAES teams 
pulled an NFE part and one of the teams finished about thirty percent faster than the other 
two teams. 
3a. Traditional 3 2 land 7 65 minutes 1 
3b. Traditional 3 2 3,5and8 100 minutes 1 
3a. MAES Team 3 2 4 and 6 43 minutes 0 
3b. MAES Team 3 2 9 and 10 55 minutes 0 
Table A-3. Fault 2/Category 3 Results 
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Table A-3 reveals the most significant results from this MAES performance 
evaluation. As shown in Table A-3, the Non-MAES team 3a could not isolate the fault 
and on board ship would have requested technical assistance. Both MAES teams isolated 
this fault while only one Non-MAES team solved the problem taking twice as much time 
as the MAES teams. Additionally, each of the Non-MAES teams pulled an NFE which 
cost approximately $7,000 each. 
During this performance test and evaluation, MAES demonstrated that even an 
early prototype version has the power to improve mean-time-to-repair and reduce the 
number of NFE repair parts turned into the supply system.    These results were 
encouraging. 
C.        THE SECOND EXPERIMENT 
The idea for the second experiment evolved from discussions about how Navy 
training might change in the future. Driven by smaller budgets, high training costs, and 
unacceptable attrition rates, the search for a new approach to training has begun. One 
new approach suggests that "Just-in-Time" training may be the way to cut costs and 
combat high attrition rates. Without going into detail, instead of emphasizing formal 
classroom training, this approach relies on focused job specific training for sailors on how 
to perform their jobs and a job performance aid (e.g. expert system) available aboard ship 
to assist in maintenance. 
Viewing MAES as a "job performance aid" for the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS, Professor 
McCaffrey proposed that fire control technicians who were just starting the MK 92 Mod 2 
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FCS "C" school be taken into the lab and given a troubleshooting problem using MAES. 
The idea was to see how the students performed without the benefit of the 32 week 
school. 
For the actual experiment, FTC instructors chose students who were from the 
Phalanx Close-in Weapons System class. These students, like the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS 
students, have an electronics background and a general knowledge of test equipment ("A" 
school). The test groups had no prior experience with MK 92 Mod 2 FCS. 
Using MAES, the first group of students successfully isolated the test fault in 
about 25 minutes. The normally allotted time for this fault was 45 minutes. Two other 
groups followed with similar results. The use of control groups was considered but 
dismissed because the control groups would have no point of reference to begin their 
troubleshooting efforts. 
The findings seem to suggest that a basic electronics background combined with a 
tool like MAES might reduce the required training time in "C" school for new technicians 
but allow them to function at an equivalent level of expertise. Further tests and analysis of 
the training syllabus are needed to substantiate this claim. 
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APPENDIX B: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR DEPLOYING MAES TO ALL 
MK 92 MOD 2 FCS SHD?S 
This appendix provides a plan for deploying the production version of MAES to all 
MK 92 Mod 2 FCS ships. This implementation plan includes a brief discussion about the 
implementation factors and risks that will likely confront the MAES deployment team. In 
most cases, this plan does not assign specific individuals to tasks or activities. Assigning 
responsibilities should be one of the first tasks tackled by the deployment team. 
This long-term implementation plan should be viewed as a working document 
since MAES prototype deployment has not been completed. Applicable sections in this 
implementation plan should be changed based on the "lessons learned" from the 
deployment of the MAES prototype. 
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MAES IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
1. Scope.   This implementation plan covers the deployment of the production version of 
the Maintenance Advisor Expert System (MAES) to all MK 92 Mod 2 Fire Control 
System (FCS) ships. The homeports include Mayport, Pascagoula, Norfolk, San Diego 
Pearl Harbor, and Yokosuka. 
1.1 Identification. MAES is a diagnostic tool that assists fire control technicians 
m isolating faults occurring in the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS. The current version of the MAES 
software is 0.0X. Your version of the software can be verified by checking the front label 
on the installation diskettes, by viewing the label at the bottom of the program icon, or by 
starting the program and checking the top bar on the introductory screen. 
1.2 System Overview. The purpose of MAES is to put expert knowledge for 
diagnostics at the fingertips of shipboard fire control technicians. A cost/benefit study 
conducted early in the project's history showed that this expert knowledge could decrease 
the time it takes to isolate a fault and reduce the number of No-Fault Evident (NFE) repair 
parts selected by technicians. 
Relying on the engineering expertise of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port 
Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD), the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) managed the 
development of the MAES software. Funding for the project was received from 
NAVSEA and the Naval Science Advisors Program (NSAP). On completion of the 
project, NPS transitioned life cycle support for MAES to NSWC PHD in March 1997 
(tentative). 
1.3 Document Overview. This plan provides a description of those activities and 
materials that are needed to deploy MAES to all MK 92 Mod 2 FCS ships. The purpose 
of this plan is to frame the implementation process in terms of important implementation 
factors and project risks so that the deployment team accomplishes their goal of 
implementing MAES in a manner that promotes success. This plan is unclassified. 
2. Installation Overview 
2.1 Description. The deployment of MAES aboard ships involves several 
progressive phases. An introductory phase of the deployment process involves 
considering the implementation factors and risks that might influence the success of the 
MAES project. Implementation factors such as user's perception of computing 
technology, user involvement in expert system implementation, supervisor support, and 
user perception of change, have all been identified as being highly important 
implementation factors for expert systems similar to MAES. 
Along with these implementation factors, project risks such as computer literacy, 
various levels of resistance, chain-of-command support, and successful deployment 
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training should be incorporated in planning for the future implementation phases. As 
simple guidelines, the deployment team should: 
• Be sensitive to the widely varying computer skills they are likely to encounter. 
• Solicit and build support for MAES at all levels of the chain-of-command. 
• Cultivate a positive relationship with the FTSC representatives. 
• Focus on cultivating supportive "perceptions of change" at all levels of the 
chain-of-command. 
• Realize that deployment training is a Class III risk and they should not be 
deceived by its apparent simplicity. 
• Understand the importance of an effective marketing campaign when fielding 
MAES. 
The first phase entails formally establishing the long-term support infrastructure 
and communications channels. 
The second phase involves gaining the appropriate approval from the chain-of- 
command for the software to be deployed aboard ships. This will require liaison between 
the deployment team, NSWC PHD, the fleet commanders' staffs, and the type 
commanders' staffs. The deployment team should view the approval message as a 
marketing tool and as such should provide sample drafts to the type commanders' staffs. 
The third phase involves scheduling and should commence two quarters prior to 
the desired implementation dates. Factors such as busy ships' schedules combined with 
six different homeport locations will make the scheduling process one of the more 
complex tasks for the deployment team. 
The fourth phase involves conducting implementation training and the last phase 
involves providing life cycle support. 
2.1.1 Installation sites. Twenty-eight ships homeported in six different 
locations are tentatively slated to receive MAES. The type commanders' should specify 
which ships will receive MAES in their approval message. The approval message should 
task each ship to provide the deployment team with primary and secondary installation 
dates, a point of contact for installation arrangements, and a phone number. The number 
of ships may change based on decommissionings, foreign military sales, and the number of 
prototype sites. 
2.1.2 Installation Dates. The installation dates are undetermined. 
2.1.3 Method of Installation. Preferably site visit but undetermined. The 
method of installation is directly related to the various deployment training options. The 
potential training alternatives include: 
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• On-site training by a deployment team from NSWC. 
• On-site training by FTSC representatives. 
• Training by a deployment team at a central site such as the training 
centers. 
• Training at a central site in each homeport using video-teleconferencing 
capabilities. 
• Videotaped training with videotapes and a deployment kit (laptop 
loaded with MAES software, user's manuals, etc.) mailed to the ships. 
• Written training and a deployment kit mailed to the ships. 
• For deployed ships, written training and a deployment kit could be 
mailed with a follow-up visit performed by NSWC or FTSC when the 
ships return to their homeport. 
2.2 Contact Point. The contact points for this installation are: 
Henry Seto, Project Engineer 
Area Defense Systems Engineering Department 
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division 
Code 4W32 
4363 Missile Way 
Port Hueneme, California 93043 
Phone: (805)982-0141 DSN551- 
e-mail: Seto_Henry/4W00_AreaDefSysEngDept@om.nswses.navy.mil 
Professor Martin J. McCaffrey 
Systems Management Curricular Office (Code 36) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road, Room 220 
Monterey, CA 93943-5104 
Phone: (408)656-2488 DSN878- 
e-mail: mjmccafr@nps.navy.mil 
2.3 Support Materials. 
|   [     Prepackaged user's manuals for bundled software such as 
Microsoft® Windows and DOS 6.2. 
|   |     Laptop computer preloaded with MAES. 
|   [     User's manual for the laptop computer. 
|    |     Two copies of MAES software diskettes, Version 0.0X. 
MAES installation instructions. 
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D MAES user's manual. 
|   |     Procedures for obtaining software updates, submitting change 
proposals or reporting errors. 
I I     Procedures for receiving help. 
2.4 Training. Based on information gathered from the deployment of the MAES 
prototype, this section should discuss the plans for training shipboard fire controlmen. 
This section should discuss a general orientation for both the software and hardware, 
classroom training (if required), and "hands-on" training. 
2.5 Tasks. A general description of the tasks required to deploy MAES to the 
ships and the responsible organization or person is provided below: 
a. Project Engineer from NSWC PHD will prepare the requests for 
authority to deploy MAES to the respective type commanders. 
b. Project Engineer from NSWC PHD will draft recommended inputs to 
the type commanders' approval message. 
c. Project Engineer from NSWC PHD will create a list of prospective 
installation sites and dates for submission to the applicable scheduling conference. Access 
to Atlantic Fleet ships is gained through scheduling conference inputs. Access 
requirements for Pacific Fleet ships may differ. 
d. NPS will create a MAES marketing campaign which will include 
providing educational information to various commands and publishing articles in 
periodicals such as Surface Warfare or Proceedings. 
e. The overall planning, coordination, and preparation for the installation 
visits will be the responsibility of (staff representative) from COMNAVSURLANT, (staff 
representative) from COMNAVSURPAC, and the project engineer from NSWC PHD. 
NSWC PHD. 
The installation team will be comprised of at least one engineer from 
g. Project Engineer from NSWC PHD will ensure that all documentation 
applicable to the implementations is available prior to the installation dates. 
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h. Project Engineer from NSWC PHD will ensure that all hardware and 
peripheral devices are available for transfer on the installation date. 
i. Project Engineer from NSWC PHD will plan, coordinate, and conduct 
training as required. 
j. (Ships' point-of-contact) will ensure that designated fire controlmen are 
available and attend MAES implementation training. This individual will also arrange an 
orientation briefing for the Commanding Officer and other interested command personnel. 
follow-up calls. 
k. Project Engineer from NSWC PHD will conduct post-implementation 
Note: NPS faculty and student participation may occur depending on tasking. 
2.6 Security and privacy. Since this software is unclassified, special security 
procedures will not be required to protect MAES. The pilferable nature of the laptop 
computer will make it necessary to immediately serialize it and either include it on the 
applicable command's controlled equipage inventory or test equipment inventory. 
3. Site Specific Information. This section provides a template for tracking 
implementation related information specific to each ship. This section assumes adoption 
of an on-site implementation strategy. 
3.1 Site, Schedule, and Contact Matrix. 





3.2 Implementation Visit Tasks. This section outlines the schedule of tasks to 
be accomplished during the installation. Some items may change or items may be added 
based on the NSAP evaluation deployment. This schedule should be presented as a Plan 
of Action and Milestones (POA&M) listing tasks in chronological order. Some of the 
activities that should be included are: 
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T-120. Provide scheduling conference inputs. 
T-90. Order laptops/surge protectors/cases. 
T-45. Contact ships scheduled for installations. Establish points-of-contact 
and determine primary/secondary installation dates. 
T-14. Ensure that the laptops and supporting peripherals are available. If 
shipping computers, ensure that MAES software is preloaded and allow two 
weeks lead time for shipping. 
T-14. Load MAES software onto the laptop and test. 
T-14. Assemble all training materials and support documentation. 
T-7. Confirm all arrangements one week prior. 
T-3. Confirm security clearances have been received by ship. 
Conduct in-brief with the Commanding Officer and designated officers, chief 
petty officers, and work center representatives. 
Conduct computer orientation training. 
Conduct MAES software orientation training. 
Review all provided materials including user's manual for the hardware and 
software. 
Review special procedures for getting help, completing trouble reports, 
submitting error reports, etc. 
Conduct out-brief with the Commanding Officer and designated officers, chief 
petty officers, and work center representatives as necessary. 
T+14. Conduct follow-up survey by phone or SALTS. 
3.3 Facilities. This section will describe the physical facilities and 
accommodations needed to support implementation training. This task will become 
important if the implementation training is held some place other than on the ship. 
Lessons learned from the NSAP deployment and evaluation will provide valuable details. 
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APPENDIX C: INTEGRATION PLAN FOR INCLUDING MAES IN THE MK 92 
MOD 2 FCS "C" SCHOOL CURRICULUM 
This appendix provides a plan for integrating MAES into the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS 
"C" School curriculum. The integration plan includes a brief discussion about the 
implementation factors and risks that will likely confront the MAES deployment team. In 
most cases, this plan does not assign specific individuals to tasks or activities. Assigning 
responsibilities should be one of the first tasks tackled by the deployment team.    - 
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MAES INTEGRATION PLAN 
1. Scope.   This integration plan covers the formal integration of the Maintenance 
Advisor Expert System (MAES) into the MK 92 Mod 2 Fire Control System (FCS) "C" 
school curriculum. This plan includes the fleet training centers in Dam Neck, Virginia and 
San Diego, California. 
1.1 Identification. MAES is a diagnostic tool that assists fire control technicians 
m isolating faults occurring in the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS. The current version of the MAES 
software is 0.0X. Your version of the software can be verified by checking the front label 
on the installation diskettes, by viewing the label at the bottom of the program icon, or by 
starting the program and checking the top bar on the introductory screen. 
1.2 System Overview. The purpose of MAES is to put expert knowledge at the 
fingertips of shipboard fire control technicians. A cost/benefit study conducted early in the 
project's history showed that this knowledge could decrease the time it takes to isolate a 
fault and reduce the number of No-Fault Evident (NFE) repair parts selected by 
technicians. 
Relying on the engineering expertise of the Naval Surface Warface Center Port 
Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD), the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) managed the 
development of the MAES software. Funding for the project was received from 
NAVSEA and the Naval Science Advisors Program (NSAP). On completion of the 
project, NPS transitioned life cycle support for MAES software to NSWC PHD in March 
1997 (tentative). 
1.3 Document Overview. This plan provides a description of those activities and 
materials that are needed to integrate MAES into the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS "C" school 
curriculum. The purpose of this plan is to frame the integration process in terms of 
important implementation factors and project risks so that the deployment team 
accomplishes their goal of implementing MAES in a manner that promotes success. This 
plan is unclassified. 
2. Installation Overview 
2.1 Description. A standard implementation process might begin with an 
introduction to the system supported by familiarization training. This step will not be 
necessary for the integration of MAES into the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS "C" school curriculum 
because of the prior experience that the training centers have with MAES. Instead, this 
implementation process will focus on post-implementation support issues which are 
important to the long-term viability of MAES. 
To set the stage, the deployment team should review those implementation factors 
and risks that might influence the success of the MAES project. Implementation factors 
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such as user's perception of computing technology, user involvement in expert system 
implementation, supervisor support, and user perception of change, have all been 
identified as being highly important implementation factors for expert systems similar to 
MAES. Along with these implementation factors, project risks such as training center 
acceptance and advocacy, chain-of-command support, and deployment training should be 
given careful consideration. 
As simple guidelines, the deployment team should: 
• Emphasize to the training centers' instructors the importance of building 
positive perceptions of this technology in the opinions of the students. 
• Describe to the instructors how their support and involvement are important. 
• Understand that with the training centers there are actually two groups of 
users, the students and the instructors. 
• Focus on cultivating supportive "perceptions of change" on the part ofthe 
instructors. 
• Realize that deployment training is a Class m risk and they should not be 
deceived by its apparent simplicity. 
• Understand the importance of an effective marketing campaign when fielding 
MAES. 
contact are: 
2.1.1 Installation sites. The two training centers' addresses and points of 
Fleet Combat Training Center Atlantic, Dam Neck 
CodeN723C 
Weapons Training Department 
1912 Regulus Avenue 
Virginia Beach, Virginia 23461-2098 
Points of contact:       LT Tommy Johnson 
(804)433-6351 DSN433- 
(804) 433-7492 (fax) 
or 
FCC(SW) Ken Turman 
(804)433-6691 ore-mail 
FCTCLANT.N723TKD@netpmsa.cnet.navy.mil 
Fleet Training Center 
Box 368035,   FLEETTRACEN Code 424 
3975 Norman Scott Road, Suite 1 
San Diego, CA 92136-5588 
Point of contact:        FCC(S W) Myers 
(619)556-7577 DSN 526- 
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2.1.2 Installation Dates. The installation dates are undetermined. 
2.1.3 Method of Installation. Site visit. 
2.2 Contact Point. The contact points for this installation are: 
Henry Seto, Project Engineer 
Area Defense Systems Engineering Department 
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division 
Code4W32 
4363 Missile Way 
Port Hueneme, California 93043 
Phone: (805)982-0141 DSN551- 
e-mail: Seto_Henry/4W00_AreaDefSysEngDept@om.nswses.navyTmil 
Professor Martin J. McCaffrey 
Systems Management Curricular Office (Code 36) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road, Room 220 
Monterey, CA 93943-5104 
Phone: (408)656-2488 DSN878- 
e-mail: mjmccaff@nps.navy.mil 
2.3 Support Materials. 
|   |     Prepackaged user's manuals for bundled software such as 
Microsoft® Windows and DOS 6.2. 
|   [     Laptop computers. 
| [ User's manual for the laptop computer. 
| | MAES software diskettes, Version 0.0X 
| | MAES installation instructions. 
| | Laptop compatible overhead projector. 
I I A copy of MAES knowledge diagnostic trees. 
[   |     Procedures for obtaining software updates, submitting change 
proposals or reporting errors. 
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2.4 Training. Training will focus on familiarizing the fleet training centers' 
instructors with the various support materials described above. General orientation 
training and other forms of introductory training for first time users will not be required at 
the fleet training centers unless key training center contacts detach prior to the scheduled 
installations: 
2.5 Tasks. A general description of the tasks required to deploy MAES to the 







plannin& coordination, and preparation for the installation 
will be the responsibility of the project engineer from NSWC PHD, Chief Petty Officer 
Myers from FTC, San Diego, and Chief Petty Officer Turman from FCTC, Dam Neck. 
b. The installation team will be comprised of at least one engineer #om 
NSWC PHD. NPS faculty and student participation may apply. 
c. Project engineer from NSWC PHD will ensure that all documentation 
applicable to the implementations are available prior to the installation dates. 
d. Project engineer from NSWC PHD will ensure that all hardware and 
peripheral devices are available for transfer on the installation date. 
e. Project engineer from NSWC PHD will plan and conduct training as 
required. 
f. Chief Myers and Chief Turman will identify those instructors who will 
receive MAES training at their respective training centers. 
2.6 Security and privacy. Since this software is unclassified, special security 
procedures will not be required to protect MAES. The pilferable nature of the laptop 
computer will make it necessary to immediately serialize it and include it on the applicable 
command's minor property inventory. 
Note: NPS faculty and student participation may occur depending on tasking. 
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APPENDIX D: MAES SYSTEM LEVEL DESCRIPTION 
The MAES system level description provides data that will be used to maintain the 
system. It will include a brief overview of the system's purpose, the system development 
environment, the target operational environment, the system architecture, and resulting 
products. As mentioned in Chapter V, the system level description is one of four 
documentation products that will be developed for MAES. Information from these 
documents will be integrated into a Software Transition Plan when all of the documents 
have been completed. 
This is an initial outline for the system level description. Improvements to this 
document should be made as additional information about the production version of the 
MAES software becomes available. Information contained in this document has been 
drawn from a number of sources. Lawrence Scruggs, the software engineer for the 
Calibration module, provided the majority of the information comprising this system level 
description. The deliverable document will be developed as part of the production funded 
tasking. 
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MK 92 Mod 2 Fire Control System 
Maintenance Advisor Expert System 
(MAES) 
SYSTEM LEVEL DESCRIPTION 
Prepared By 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
Prepared For 
Naval Surface Warfare Center 
Port Hueneme Division 
13 September 1996 
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I. Document Scope. 
A. System Applicability. The Maintenance Advisor Expert System(MAES) is a 
diagnostic expert system designed to provide training and troubleshooting assistance to 
fire control technicians who maintain the MK 92 Mod 2 Fire Control System (FCS) 
installed aboard U.S. Navy Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates. 
B. The purpose of this document is to describe the purpose of MAES, its 
development environment, the overall system architecture, and the products which form 
MAES. 
II. Applicable Documentation. 
A. List of MIL Specs used (if any) - None 
B. List of government documents used - None 
C. List of commercial documents used - Will be available after the integration of 
the performance and calibration modules. 
in. System Overview. 
A Development Rationale. Repeatedly listed on the 
CINCLANTFLT/CINCPACFLT Fleet Troubled Combat Systems Reports, the MK 92 
Mod 2 FCS is a maintenance intensive system that is plagued by excessive downtime and 
often requires outside technical assistance to repair. MAES attempts to provide 
shipboard Fire Control technicians with access to expert knowledge and troubleshooting 
expertise through a software program. 
B. Purpose of MAES. The main purpose for developing MAES is to enhance the 
ability of MK 92 Mod 2 Fire Control technicians to better determine, diagnose, and 
resolve problems occurring within their systems without the assistance of outside technical 
representatives. (McGaha, 1994) While MAES provides diagnostic capabilities, it is not 
integrated into the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS and is best deployed on a standalone laptop 
computer. 
C. Development Environment. 
1. Naval Postgraduate School computer laboratory provides access to 
research and commercial software and hardware. Provided resources include internet 
access to support tools such as software updates. 
2. Commercial Expert-System-Development Shell (Integrated 
Development Environment or IDE). 
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a) Terms used to describe the IDE and "programming language" 
include "graphical programming," "visual programming," and "iconic programming." 
One's first visual impression might remind one of formal structure charts used in software- 
engineering documentation. 
b) MAES is currently two application files (Calibration and 
Performance) each containing sets of procedures. Each procedure is a set of nodes and 
arcs assembled to provide assistance in troubleshooting specific areas of the MK 92 Mod 
2 FCS. The procedures generally follow the troubleshooting structure charts provided by 
the expert. 
c) Nodes and arcs (represented in the IDE's GUI by icons and 
colored lines) do the work of traditional declarative and procedural code lines (as in Ada, 
C, Pascal, FORTRAN, SAS, etc.). 
(1) Nodes represent reusable "packages" of code that 
generate CRT displays and accept user input, make decisions based on user-provided data 
and rules provided by experts, and link procedures. 
(2) Arcs represent program-control flow. 
(3) Data flow is not represented. 
3. Personal Computer compatible desktop computer. 
a) Intel 80486 compatible, 50 MHz, 8 MB RAM, 150 MB hard 
drive, 100 MB Iomega Zip drive, Hewlett Packard Laserjet IIP printer. 
b) Intel 80586 compatible, 100 MHz, 16 MB RAM. 
4. Support tools. 
a) The internet provides communication among team members and 
access to maintenance items for development tools. 
b) MS-Office provides administrative and documentation support. 
c) Image management relies on COTS software. 
D. Description of Target Operational Environment. Personal Computer 
compatible laptop computer. 
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1. Intel 80486/80586 compatible, 100 MHz, 16 MB RAM, 500 MB hard 
drive. 
2. MAES Calibration and Performance modules currently require 20 
megabytes of disk space. These modules can run in eight megabytes of RAM. 
E. Description of System Architecture. The main Adept constructs are 
applications, procedures, and nodes/arcs. An application usually consists of several 
procedures, where each procedure is made up of nodes, displays, variables, and functions. 
An application typically corresponds to the overall program. (Smith, 1994) 
Programs called procedures are used to build an application. A procedure consists 
of a series of visual objects called nodes. A node is a graphical object which represents a 
specific step or series of steps within any given procedure. It is a visual object that allows 
end users to design and implement an expert system without having to deal with 
traditional text-based programming code. (Smith, 1994) 
The MAES program would be considered an application. Procedures supporting 
the application would presently be structured around two modules, the performance 
module and the calibration module. Nodes representing yes/no/unknown decisions are 
used to build procedures which are drawn from the domain expert's knowledge document. 
F. Description of Validation Methodology. Validation has been performed 
through visual inspection of the product by experts and the target audience. 
G. Description of MAES products. Loaded on a laptop computer, MAES 
software provides MK 92 Mod 2 FCS technicians access to expert knowledge to assist 
them in isolating faults discovered during MK 92 Mod 2 FCS Daily Systems Operabilitv 
Tests (DSOT). H y 
IV. Development Environment 
A. Hardware Requirements. Personal Computer compatible desktop computer. 
1. Intel 80486 compatible, 50 MHz, 8 MB RAM, 150 MB hard drive, 100 
MB Iomega Zip drive, Hewlett Packard Laserjet IIP printer. 
2. Additional computers are used for communications and demonstrations 
in support of the project. 
B. Software Environment. The software environment for MAES includes 
Microsoft DOS® 6.2 and Microsoft Windows® 3.1. 
C. Software tools which are MAES (or expert system) specific. SoftSell Adept® 
2.21. v 
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V. Target Operational Environment 
A. Hardware Requirements. Intel 80586 compatible, 100 MHz, 16 MB RAM. 
B. Software Environment. The user must interface through three levels of 
software - DOS, Windows, and Adept - to operate MAES. 
VI. System Architecture 
A. Basic System Structure. (Should show how the different software units 
interface with each other. Need to list everything required to run MAES including the 
operating system, commercial software packages, databases, etc.) 
B. Structure of all units developed specifically for MAES. (Internal organization, 
data type requirements, unit interactions.) 
VII. Validation Methodology 
A. What type of validation is planned? 
B. Scope of validation. 
C. Location, schedule, equipment requirements, and personnel requirements. 
VIII. Products 
A. Documentation developed for MAES 
1. System Level Description 
2. Software Design Document 
3. MAES User's Manual 
4. Version Description Document 
B. Software developed for MAES 
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APPENDIXE: FORMS 
This appendix contains three existing forms or reports that can be adapted to 
support MAES reporting procedures. Use of these forms will take advantage of existing 
reporting channels and procedures rather than creating new ones. These forms include the 
NSWC PHD Software Trouble Report, the Digital Systems Feedback Report (NSWSES- 
3142/1), and the Engineering Change Proposal (DD Form 1692). The function of these 
forms is described in Chapter HI and summarized below: 
NSWC PHD Software Trouble Report (STR): The STR should be used mainly by 
engineers who are familiar with the MAES software and the MK 92 Mod 2 FCS to report 
software problems or to propose software enhancements. 
Digital Systems Feedback Report (DSFR): The DSFR serves the same purpose as 
the STR but it uses a simpler format. The DSFR is primarily intended for use by sailors 
and support personnel to report software errors, submit trouble reports, or recommend 
enhancements. 
Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs): Open SFR's are periodically reviewed by 
the Software Configuration Control Board and rewritten as ECPs. Certain ECPs are 
selected for a software build referred to as a version release. 
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6. Official Program Designation 
9a. Program Medium 
12. Responsible Modale(s) 
9b. Serial No. 
14. Originator 
17. Runtime 
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3. Error Priority * 
12   3   4   5 
4a. SCCB No. 
7. Official Program Document 
10. Reference Document 
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4b. ISEA No. 4c. Orig No. 
8. Unit/Site 
11. Function Affected 
16. Td/EH 
19. Interface with 
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During Ron Yes No N/A 
After Restart Yes No N/A 
After Reload Yes     No     N/A 
23. Trouble Description 
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Complication Typewriter O/P 
Sample Program Memory Map 
Object Program Memory Dump 
Source Program Other 
22b. Other Systems/Programs Affected 
24. Response 
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DIGITAL SYSTEMS FEEDBACK REPORT (DSFR) 
WEAPONS SYSTEM 
MC: MOD: 
SHIPBOARD MUHT OF CONTACT 
SHIP KAUE 
PHONE NOMKft Oft CONTACT METHOS 
DELIVERY TAPE SERIAL NUMBER 
NULL NUMBER 
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APPENDIX F: SOFTWARE TRANSITION PLAN 
This appendix provides the Software Transition Plan (STrP) Data Item Description 
(DID) from the Department of Defense's, Software Development and Documentation 
Military Standard, MTL-STD-498. The STrP identifies hardware, software, and other 
resources needed for life cycle support of deliverable software. It also describes the 
developer's plans for transitioning deliverable items to the support agency. In the case of 
MAES software, the deliverable items include documents such as the System Level 
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3.1 The Software Transition Plan (STrP) identifies the hardware, software, and other resource „««H-H W 
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10-1   General instruction;. 
"i 1. bisiftieuhoN STATEMENT —  (Continued on Page 2) 
D.STR,BUT,ON STATEMENTA^pproved for public felease; ^^ .s ^^       -, 
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13S/123 Previous-editions are obsolete 
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Software Transition Plan (STrP) 
Dl-IPSC-81429 
10. PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS -10.1 General Instructions (continued) 
c
- Title paoe or identiftor. The document shall include a title page containing, as 
applicable: document number; volume number; version/revision indicator; security 
markings or other restrictions on the handling of the document; date; document title; 
name, abbreviation, and any other identifier for the system, subsystem, or item to 
which the document applies; contract number; CDRL item number; organization for 
which the document has been prepared; name and address of the preparing 
organization; and distribution statement. For data in a database or other alternative 
form, this information shall be included on external and internal labels or by equivalent 
identification methods. 
d- Tab»e of contents. The document shall contain a table of contents providing the 
number, title, and page number of each titled paragraph, figure, table, and appendix. 
For data in a database or other alternative form, this information shall consist of an 
internal or external table of contents containing pointers to, or instructions for 
accessing, each paragraph, figure, table, and appendix or their equivalents. 
e
* Paoe nwmherina/lahftlinrt- Each page shall contain a unique page number and display the 
document number, including version, volume, and date, as applicable. For data in a 
database or other alternative form, files, screens, or other entities shall be assigned 
names or numbers in such a way that desired data can be indexed and accessed. 
f
-    Response to t?"prinq instructions.    If a paragraph is tailored out of this DID. the 
resulting document shall contain the corresponding paragraph number and title followed   : 
by  This paragraph has been tailored out." For data in a database or other alternative 
form, this representation need occur only in the table of contents or equivalent. 
°- y*ljj[g Paragraphs find, suPParagranhs. Any section, paragraph, or subparagraph in 
this DID may be written as multiple paragraphs or subparagraphs to enhance readability. 
n
- Standard data descriptions. If a data description required by this DID has been 
published in a standard data element dictionary specified in the contract, reference to 
an entry in that dictionary is preferred over including the description itself. 
L
 Substitution of existing documents. Commercial or other existing documents may be 




. Content requirement?. Content requirements begin on the following page The 
numbers shown designate the paragraph numbers to be used in the document. Each such 
number is understood to have the prefix "10.2" within this DID. For example, the paragraph 
numbered 1.1 is understood to be paragraph 10.2.1.1 within this DID 
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10.  PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS -10.2 Content Requirements (continued) 
1.   S_£2E£. This section shall be divided into the following paragraphs. 
1-1   Identification.  This paragraph shall contain a full identification of the svstem and tho 
ti?Äbhrlhi? 7? dOCUment aPPHeS' indUdinfl' 8S aPP,iCab,e' ^S^S^£^ title(s), abbreviation(s). version number(s), and release number(s). '«noensj, 
soL^fSS^r'7hiS Para9raP,h Sha" brief,y State the purpose of the sVstem and the 
«°JT?aü Ch th,S document aPP|ies- »t shall describe the general nature of the svstem 
tSiS^SST^ tHe hlSt0rV °f SVStem deve,°Pme«*' °P«^on. and maTnterSS 
LnH n LIT ^Ct ?P°nSOr'acqu,rer' "S6'* devel°Per. and support agencies; identify currem 
and planned operating sites; and list other relevant documents. 
•J-3 Rocumept overview. This paragraph shall summarize the purpose and contents of this 
document and shall describe any security or privacy considerations a.sSS^3?te ^ 
STVP to'a^?riSHiP-T" °thPr P'^ Tnis Para9raph shall describe the relationship, if any of the 
STrP to other project management plans. y 
2.   Referennfid dorrwmftntfi. This section shall list the number, title, revision and dat« M «n 
documents referenced in this document.  This section shall also IdenmLsLlclior a 
documents not available through normal Government stocking actSs 
HocffirT^ ^'Pm resnnrrps- Th|s section shall be divided into paragraphs to identify and 
induILm TTH98 need8d t0 SUPPOrt the d8,lverab,e software^ T^^STXu include .terns needed to control, copy, and distribute the software and its documentation and 
SJ&^ä*document-test*eva,uate- "—■ «^srsss 
soL^T^f' T*iS P.ara0raph sha" descrifae the facilities needed to support the deliverable 
a. Specific models, versions, and configurations 
b. Rationale for the selected hardware 
c    Reference to user/operator manuals or instructions for each item, as applicable 
have, an ,tem the support agency must acquire, or «herdescnpt^of sW? ._- 
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10. PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS - 10.2 Content Requirements (continued) 
wh«thi?KUS- be acqujred' ^formation about a current source of supply, includino 
theetimer TüTe?y "^ aVa"ab,e "* Whether jt iS 6Xpected to be ^-Ä 
Ihl°[£m f"aboutr"anufa«urersupport. licensing.and data rights, including whether 
the item is currently supported by the manufacturer, whether it is expected to be 
supported at the time of delivery, whether licenses will be assigned to SSUDD<S? 
agency, and the terms of such licenses Pport 
g.    Security and privacy considerations, limitations, or other items of interest 
doLSlfJä?*' ™? P«*»»* sha« Wentify and describe the software and associated 
t«mTJT, nB°ded t0 support the ^«verable software. This software mafSde 
tesTda^lS ?ftWare e,;9ineerin9 (CASE) t00,s'data m these **. e-StaSSÄ 
'" ZSS^JSSSS" ""*"• "*" ~-~ —- «—». and 
b. Rationale for the selected software 
c Reference to user/operator manuals or instructions for each item, as applicable 
d
" w,e.nSCHair°n °^eaCh !°ftWare item and doc"™nt as acquirer-furnished, an item that 
^JS^VZS*"" a9enCy' ^ ltem the SUPPOrt a9ency is known to nave, an item the support agency must acquire, or other description of status 
6
'    IlhlTf TS- be act'ulred' '"formation about a current source of supply includino 
Ä oÄrJ ^^ aVa',ab,e "* "**" * " "^ ^Ä 
f
'     ^Tl110" ab,°Ut Vend0r SUpport' ,icensin9' and data rights, including whether the 
TZZ'tT '^T6? bV ^ Vendor' whether * is exPe«ed to be^upported « 
g.    Security and privacy considerations, limitations, or other items of interest 
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Names, identification numbers, version numbers, and release numbers, as applicable 
Rationale for including each document in the list 
Identification of each document as acquirer-furnished, an item that will be delivered 
to the support agency, an item the support agency is known to have anTZ til 
support agency must acquire, or other description of status **" ** 
If a document must be acquired, information about where to acquire it     ../> 
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10. PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS-10.2 Content Requirements (continued) 
e. Information about licensing and data rights 
f. Security and privacy considerations, limitations, or other items of interest 
I^L5S*^:/hlS par?9raPn sha" describe the personnel needed to support the deliverable 
ZSlZZ'JE   f,n9 ant,Cipaifd number of P^onne!. types and levels of skills andI «SSL 
d2LZ      ♦ clearances-   ™» Paragraph shall cite, as applicable, actual staffing on the 
development project as a basis for the staffing needs cited. 
drtJrTZ^Z™*' V^ P?8™»* sha"idantif y a°y other resources needed to support the 
tnnZ!b,e "ftwara: ,nc,udad maV ** consumables such as magnetic tapes and distettes 
together w,th an eshmate of the type and number that should be acquired atsKettes- 
t1i'Jcimnol?Il°n-HhiP ? <T.mp?nwity- Tnis Paragraph shall identify the interrelationships of SSSSÄ"^,n the preceding para9raphs- A ,igure ™* »» used <° ^ the 
riPCü?hCgmmffn(Jed^rn0pftlfrf,f?-  This section sna" be dividßd «nto paragraphs as needed to descr.be any procedures, including advice and lessons learned, that the develooer mav wiS ÄSSTi'upport a9encv for supporting the d"ß ^^!^2Ä 
LiESS?', ^ SeCti°n Sha" be divided int0 Paragraphs as appropriate to describe the 
T^TZ^lZ.tra,nin9 support personne, t0 support of *he de« softTrrebVhiSe 
a. The schedule, duration, and location for the training 
b. The delineation between classroom training and "hands-on" training 
c    Provision (either directly or by reference) for: 
1) Familiarization with the operational software and target computer(s) 
2) Familiarization with the support software and host system 
t6he SaS:rW- ThJS SeCti°n Sha" deSCribe antiCipated areas " *»"0« to 
7.   Iransitipn planninq. This section shall be divided into paragraphs as needed to describe 
2ÜS3ÄTS JoZS09 the ™,e ~ -ha «*"£££ Tht 
chTcUut* thesvoefrtwato the support agency; packa9in9- ^pmJ^sa«.0:^ 
checkou  of the onZ   TT env,ronment; Packaging, shipment, installation and 
checkout of the operational software; and training of support personnel. 
b.     Roles and responsibilities for each activity 
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10.  PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS- 10.2 Content Requirements (continued) 
°°   J^f. reS0UrCeSne.f,(!ed t0 carry out the transit''on activities and the source from which each resource will be provided n 
d
*    SEKland "V16.?*0"68 for conducting the transition activities. These schedules 
and m,lestones shall be compatible with the contract master schedule.    SCnMUles 
e
*    e^r^ntf°r ,nSta,,ati0n "" Ch6Ck°Ut °f deKverab,e items in the SUPP°« 
LäS? J!f US"1 sha".comain 8ny 9eneral **""■*" that aids in understanding this 
2X2!? ^f-'.1**?"«' '"formation, glossary, rationale). This section shall include en 
dES^nS"? °J 8" 8Cr0nymS' abbreviati°«*< and their m«nir^««^h^E document and a l.st of any terms and definitions needed to understand Ms document 
A. ABESDdj)ffis   Appendixes may be used to provide information published seoaratelv for 
convenience in document maintenance (e.g.. charts, classified dawZLrtSl J?h 
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APPENDIX G. HARDWARE, SOFTWARE, AND DOCUMENTATION 
REQUEREMENTS 
This appendix summarizes the anticipated hardware, software, and documentation 
requirements necessary to deploy MAES to the ships, integrate it into the "C" school 
curriculum, and transition life cycle support for it to NSWC PHD. This matrix should be 
used as a working document for future planning. 
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Hardware User's Manual 
Prebundled S/W User's 
Manuals 
Knowledge Documentation 
MAES User's Manual 
System Level Description 
Software Design Document 
Version Description Document 
MAES Deployment Plan 
(Ships) 
MAES Integration Plan (FTCs) 

























































Table G-l. MAES H/W, S/W, and Documentation Requirements Matrix 
Note 1. One laptop would go to the NAVSEA MK 92 Program Manager and the other 
two would go to each of the type commanders' staffs. 
Note 2. Two copies of the MAES software should be provided to each activity. One 
copy should remain with the users and the other copy should be transferred to the 
activity's ADP officer or software librarian. 
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